

DISCUSSION PAPER

Migration, Urbanization and Security: Challenges of Governance and Development in Balochistan

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ABSTRACT

This discussion paper focuses on four questions: how do migration and urbanization together transform the socioeconomic and cultural life patterns of the province of Balochistan in Pakistan? Second, have migration and urbanization aggravated security and eroded institutions of governance in the province? Third, has the 18th Constitutional Amendment contributed towards deflating pressures of migration and urbanization and set a direction for social sector development (empowering the marginalized through local governance) and curbing terrorism? Finally, how has the arrival and continuous stay of Afghan refugees impacted urban life in and around Quetta city? In this context, some preliminary research findings and ideas are presented in this discussion paper for developing a comprehensive governance and development policy that can be applied to cities in the province. While the study adopts a broad approach to analysing the said questions, data provided refers to the period between 2000 and 2016.



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INTRODUCTION

Pakistan has oscillated between cycles of prolonged military rule (1958- 1971, 1977- 1988, 1999-2007) followed by surges of protest movements for the restoration of democracy. Citizens expected that a transition to democracy would improve governance and promote economic development.¹ However, frail democratic governments (in 1972-77, 1985-1999 and 2008-2017) could not concentrate on building institutions of governance such as establishing the supremacy of parliament, reforming the bureaucracy or strengthening the independence of judiciary and media. While many of these have expanded over time, delivery of services and social justice remain constricted. As a result, misgovernance has increasingly come to be associated with civilian governments.

Pakistan's political canvas depicts patterns of civil military tension against the backdrop of prolonged periods of military rule. It has witnessed spurts of economic growth followed by periods of economic stagnation – varying between socialist and capitalist modes of development. In the post 1971 phase, Pakistan embarked on a path of socialist economic development (nationalization, land reforms, civil service reforms and the purge of the top military brass). However, between 1977 and 1988, the military regime initiated a reversal of earlier policies and dismantled the socialist route to development in favor of military-hegemonic privatization and denationalization. Civilian political leaders and politics were curbed and Islamization of laws and 'Islamic ideology' imposed on the political and social spheres of life.² Islamization policies of the military regime exacerbated sectarian conflict—explicit predilection and enforcement of Sunni Shariah laws alienated the Shiite minority—while curbing civilian politics was equated with suppression of rights and interests of ethnic groups and the restriction of provincial autonomy. The paradoxical policies of the civilian and military regimes further inflamed ethnic and sectarian tensions. In the 1980s an astute observer of Pakistan, Lawrence Ziring characterized Pakistan as an 'Enigma of Development' – where any consistent path of development was difficult to identify.³ More recently, particularly since 2002, Pakistan, like many other developing countries, has been affected by the technology-driven forces of globalization and has embraced the neo-liberal model of development, which encourages foreign direct investment, privatization of industry and an acceptance of free market principles. Pakistan's involvement in the American-led Global War on Terrorism further complicated its configuration of governance and development. Furthermore, internal dissent and foreign involvement has strained interethnic relations and sectarian divides, disrupting social and political harmony, with peace becoming a tragic casualty of terrorism. As a result, inequality of income and regional inequality across the provinces is a visible and worrying trend. It is in this broad context that we need to examine the case of the province of Balochistan, where the twin processes of migration and urbanization are changing the dynamics of economic development. Balochistan has for decades been one of Pakistan's most troubled regions, consistently floundering on economic and developmental goals. Its relative neglect in the past, ridden with stories of ethnic strife and sectarian violence, simmering low level insurgency, political treachery and economic plight has undermined its people's true strength and capacity to progress.

Migration and urbanization are also changing the demographic landscape of Balochistan, where an evolving ethnic mix is impacting cultural and political dispensations. Pakistan's future however lies in Balochistan, not only because it is territorially the largest province endowed with many natural resources, but also because without ensuring the cultural, social and political rights of the Baloch people, Pakistan as a nation will continue to suffer. Pakistan's ruling elite has failed to recognize the cultural sensitivities of both the Baloch as an ethnic group, and the 'Balochistani' in a wider provincial and regional sense,⁴ and have ignored demands of adequate political representation while being oblivious to the repeated violations of human rights and provincial interests. Without instituting

policies that cater to the linguistic, cultural, religious, economic and political needs of Balochistan, Pakistan cannot achieve equitable development. Other provinces in the country also experience episodes of ethnic discontent and a marginalization of minorities, but the rumblings have been fiercest in Balochistan. The cumulative effect of such indifference and insensitivity are vicious cycles of social turbulence and low human development levels with a possible escalation of violent political unrest. Unless these vicious cycles are broken in Balochistan, Pakistan's growth potential will continue to be constrained.

Balochistan's history of ethnic strife and political disharmony has been garnering greater attention as incidents of 'missing persons,' sporadic insurgencies and strong-arm tactics of the Pakistani state become more common. The Hazara community in particular has disproportionately been affected as a convenient target of violent extremism, substantially impacting the country's human rights progress. Despite the restoration of the democratic process in 2008, violence and corruption persist in Pakistan, while Balochistan continues to be perceived and rated as the most misgoverned province in the country.⁵

However, over the past three years, there has been growing realization within society and at the federal level that there is a need to adopt a more comprehensive approach in dealing with Balochistan's multifaceted development problems. Attention should be paid to adapting policies to the regions' cultural, socio-economic and political mêlées in particular. This demands a vision that prioritizes the people of Balochistan and gives precedence to their development goals. Particular attention needs to be paid to developing a coherent urban policy (inclusive of migration), as Balochistan assumes the position of Pakistan's fastest urbanizing province. The country is already witnessing the costs of haphazard city-planning in other mega-cities like Karachi in Sindh or Lahore in Punjab, where inter alia inefficient public service delivery, access to clean water, hygienic sanitation, inadequate housing and serious environmental hazards hinder denizens' right to safe and healthy livelihoods. Urban sprawl and overpopulated squatter settlements straiten scarce land and financial resources, while simultaneously burdening public infrastructure.

Likewise, with a growing population of migrant communities, Balochistan faces the dual challenges of migration and urbanization. A heterogeneous mix of culturally, linguistically and ethnically diverse communities tests the locals' tolerance to new ideas and their ability to adapt to socioeconomic and political changes that evidently result. The city of Quetta is already showing signs of institutional degeneration and infrastructural collapse as more people move to the provincial capital. Prioritizing these factors within Balochistan's overall development framework will be crucial to expand its frontiers of progress.

A vision that, therefore, alleviates the livelihood conditions of the most marginalized – not only giving them equal opportunities for quality health and education, employment and entrepreneurship, but also the opportunity to exercise basic rights like, freedom of speech and worship – will undoubtedly be key instruments in this process.

Indeed, Balochistan's progress depends on the socioeconomic indicators that are diverse and complex, ranging from curbing ethnic violence and combating persistent but low level insurgency to addressing challenges of human capital development and stunted economic growth. Making such a transformation in Balochistan could strengthen Pakistan's efforts towards sustainable development in the longer run.

Given this context, this study, focuses on migration and urbanization as two of the most salient features of development in the province and explores how their interaction creates both challenges and opportunities for effective governance.

MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION LINKAGE


Migration is a fundamental demographic, social and economic feature of Pakistan's development framework, substantially impacting the country's cities, towns and villages and transforming its urban demography. The very inception of Pakistan in 1947 caused unprecedented large-scale migration. An estimated 11million people moved in and out of territories that were eventually to become Pakistan. This led some to label Pakistan as a 'migrant state.' Furthermore, in 1971, the breakup of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh caused the displacement of around 3 million refugees, who migrated to areas in the 'western' part of the country including the North Western Frontier, Karachi and Balochistan, further defining the country's migrant characteristic.⁶

Migration has multiple facets including classifications such as 'internal' and 'external migration.' Internal migration refers to the movement of people within a specific national boundary and includes rural-to-urban, urban-to-urban and less frequently, urban-to-rural migration. External migration, on the other hand, involves the movement of people across national boundaries. Migration can occur as a consequence of people searching for better livelihoods or superior health and education facilities or due to more drastic causes such as war or natural disasters or a combination of the above-mentioned reasons. In the case of Balochistan, 'tribal wars' have also forced communities to migrate. For example, the Kalpar Bugtis were expelled from the Dera Bugti region as a result of clashes between them and the dominant Rahija Bugtis. A similar situation also arose between the Bugtis, Marris and Mengals, when tribesmen belonging to the latter two were forced to flee.⁷ The implications of migration are manifold. While it may lead to a more balanced regional development by uplifting living standards of poor migrant-sending households, it can also cause pollution and congestion, impacting the accessibility and quality of limited public resources in relatively affluent migrant receiving areas. In a broader sense, all types of migrations mentioned above have an impact upon labor markets, employment levels and economic productivity as well as governance, law, culture and identity. The process of migration thus has wide-ranging socioeconomic and political effects.


Official estimates of Pakistan's urban population are dated as the last official population census-taking place in 1998. However, the *Labour Force Survey 2014-15* estimates that around 35 per cent of the total population is urban compared to 65 per cent of the population being rural.⁸ According to the World Bank, this translates to an urban population of over 73.2 million with an urban population growth rate of three per cent (in 2015).⁹

As Figure 1 indicates, Pakistan is considered to be one of South Asia's most rapidly urbanizing countries, with an urban growth rate faster than that of India, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

In the decade between 2004 and 2014, there was a persistent rise in Pakistan's urban population growth rate, averaging between 3 and 3.3 per cent per year (see *Figure 2*). All of Pakistan's provinces have contributed to the rise in urban population with the exception of Sindh, which between 2001 and 2015 experienced a decline in urban population numbers (See *Figure 4*).



Data Compiled from: World Bank Data, 2016



Data Compiled from: World Bank Data, 2016


DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN BALOCHISTAN

Population Growth Rates, Migration and Urbanization

Territorially, Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan (covering around 43 per cent of the country's total area) while population wise it is the smallest, with only 6 per cent of the total population residing in the province.¹⁰ Balochistan's population was estimated at 9.6 million in 2013 and is projected to increase by over 50 per cent (to 12.11 million) during 2013-2030. Half of this is expected to be urban.¹¹

Migration has played an important role in determining the province's demographic outlook. While Balochistan houses a minuscule portion of the country's migrants (just 0.66 per cent of total migrants),¹² they nonetheless form around 1.5 per cent of the province's total population. Figure 3 illustrates this analysis.

Figure 3: Percentage Distribution of Migrant Population Currently in Balochistan by Place of Previous Residence, 2014-15



Data compiled from: Labour Force Survey 2014-15, Table 12

Furthermore, Balochistan has had the highest rates of rural to urban migration in the country, significantly impacting urban development in the region. Table 1 and Figure 4 indicate between 2001 and 2015, Balochistan witnessed a significant rise in its urban population, the highest growth in the country. In 2001, approximately 19 per cent of the province's population was urban but by 2015, it had increased to 27 per cent.

In Balochistan, the district of Quetta¹³ is the most urbanized and has an urban population of over 70 per cent.¹⁴ It is ethnically heterogeneous, with Pashtuns, Balochs, Brahvis, Hazaras and Punjabis making up the largest communities.¹⁵ Quetta district's rate of urbanization was the second highest in the country (after Islamabad) at 4 per cent per year during 1981-1998.¹⁶ Quetta district witnessed a sevenfold increase in its population between 1951 and 1998 (from 0.06 to 0.56) and by 2020; its urban population is expected to be around 1.83 million.¹⁷ Urban sprawl not only puts pressure on basic amenities such as water, electricity, health and education services, but also makes urban space costly, leading to exclusionary urban growth, intra-city disparity and the creation of a degenerated periphery. In addition to urban sprawl, Quetta is also riddled with political insecurity with frequent incidents of ethnic and sectarian hostilities, adversely impacting progress on urban development.


Afghan Wars and Migration

Pakistan has for decades been an easy transition for people migrating from Afghanistan. Foremost, the geographic proximity provides an obvious explanation to the mass exodus of those fleeing war and insurgency. In particular, after the events leading to Soviet intervention in 1979, and again after the start of the global war on terror in 2001, Pakistan witnessed a rise in Afghan migrants with recent estimates suggesting a population of 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees. The government also estimates the non-registered Afghan population to be an additional one million people.¹⁸ Some sources even approximated that in 2002 the number of migrants was as high as 3.3 million, pointing out however that many of these have returned back to Afghanistan in various "repatriation" programs.¹⁹

Table1: Distribution of Population by Provinces in Pakistan, 2001/02-2014/15

| | 2001/02 | | 2014/15 | |
|--------------------|---------|-------|---------|-------|
| | Rural | Urban | Rural | Urban |
| Balochistan | 81,04 | 18,96 | 73,4 | 26,6 |
| NWFP(KPK) | 84,96 | 15,04 | 81,59 | 18,41 |
| Punjab | 69,33 | 30,67 | 66,4 | 33,6 |
| Sindh | 49,74 | 50,26 | 51,28 | 48,72 |


Data compiled from: Pakistan Labor Force Survey 2001-2002 and Pakistan Labor Force Survey 2014-15



Although Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is home to the majority of Afghan refugees, around 62 per cent, Balochistan hosts the second highest number with around 20 per cent.²⁰ A majority of these refugees tend to be children or young adults up to the age cohort of 24, making up 64 per cent of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan.²¹ This implies a substantial diaspora looking for work and housing, depending on public health and education resources and also contributing towards the socioeconomic and political makeup of the areas they settle into. The Afghan Wars and the refugees they created thus dominate the scenario of migration in Balochistan. This has impacted the dynamics of urbanization in the province, in particular that of Quetta.

Indeed, Quetta exemplifies how external and internal factors accelerate the twin forces of migration and urbanization and consequently determine the demographic composition of the city. It has become a popular destination for Afghan migrants who share ethnic and linguistic commonalities with the local Pashtuns. Quetta district has taken in hundreds of thousands of Afghans, in fact the highest number in the province. A study in 2014 revealed that around 3,24,990 Afghan refugees lived in Quetta District, around 59 per cent of the total Afghan population in Balochistan.²² As Figure 5 illustrates, the cities of Pishin and Chaman also host a significant number of Balochistan's Afghan population.

Field research in Quetta by the Centre for Public Policy and Governance (CPPG) found that a significant portion of Afghan migrants is settled in the slum of Akhrotabad (approximately 70 per cent of the



Data compiled from: Shafqat and Zafar (2015).

city's total Afghan refugees). This has substantially contributed towards Quetta's current urban problems; a city now characterized by large number of squatter settlements, inadequate water supplies, derisory sanitation arrangements, and deteriorating road and housing infrastructure. Such scenes of deprivation and scarcity are however at a sharp contrast to Quetta's Cantonment area, a thriving sanctuary for traders, businesses and commercial enterprises. The relative security and affluence visible in the Cantonment area reveals the wide income and welfare gaps within the city, especially when compared to settlements such as Akhrotabad. Additionally as the bazaars of Quetta city decay, many businesses and traders have chosen to shift to the Cantonment area.

The Baloch unsurprisingly have been less receptive to Quetta's changing demography, reasoning that locals are being overshadowed by the Afghan Pashtuns while their migration has also facilitated the movement of Afghan Taliban into the region. As a result, in addition to dealing with the spillover effects of the Afghan War, the Baloch insurgency and separatist movements, Quetta also bears the effects of violent ethnic strife. Historically, Pashtuns have comprised the largest percentage of "indigenous" residents of Quetta, with Balochi speakers as a very small minority. Settlers i.e. migrants from across Pakistan (Punjab, Saraiki, Mohajir) to Balochistan make up a quarter of the city's population. On one hand these migrant populations make Quetta a multi-cultural city, while on the other it also ignites tensions between indigenous and settler populations. This includes rivalry between the Baloch and Pushtuns and resentment towards the Punjabi settlers and incoming Afghan migrants. Unfortunately, it is not a celebration of cultural diversity that is emerging as the dominant norm—which not in the too distant past was the hallmark of the city—but rather ethnic conflict, disharmony and violence that has continued to disrupt social and political life in Quetta.

Provincial and federal policy-makers and political leaders have done little to contribute towards promoting and sustaining cultures of tolerance in the province. Although, this is generally the case across the country, Balochistan's suffering at the hands of culturally insensitive policies is especially evident. In addition to the lingering Shia-Sunni divide and schism between various Sunni Baloch tribes, the province has also fallen short in managing socioeconomic and political relations between migrants and local communities. Existing research and literature on issues of migration recognize and underscore that migrant communities have their own housing, health and education needs and preferences which must be taken into account while designing rehabilitation and urban policies. The state must therefore encourage the process of migrants' adaptation into their adopted homes.

INSURGENCY, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

This research underscores that terrorism and sectarian violence can be both a result of migration and a cause of high rates of migration in parts of Balochistan. As a result of migration, violence has partially stemmed from the movement of some Afghan extremists into Balochistan. As a cause of migration, political violence and terrorism have been major drivers of internal migration in the province, in particular towards Quetta. Much of this violence stems from the Baloch insurgencies that have occurred in the area (which the official narrative recognises as separatist tendencies). Five of these have taken place since 1948 when Balochistan came under Pakistani control. Analysts have pointed out that a “highly centralised state of Pakistan and its unwillingness to allow regional and ethnic autonomy”²³ has led to these insurgencies. Various armed groups employ strategic guerilla warfare to send strong messages of ‘separatism and independence.’ More recently, these elements have been quite vocal in their irrefutable rejection of foreign-led development initiatives, thus raising the risk factor for the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

The origin of the insurgencies in fact predates the creation of Pakistan. In 1935, the Khan of Kalat (chief of the then princely state of Kalat) began the movement of an Independent Balochistan. However the movement could not be sustained after Independence as other Baloch chieftains rejected the Khan’s creed and in 1948 he was arrested and Balochistan acceded to Pakistan. His defeat led to a revolt by the Khan’s brother who fought for the cause till he himself was arrested in 1950. The insurgency died down but the grievances again surfaced when Balochistan was merged with other three provinces of erstwhile West Pakistan under the *One Unit scheme*. Baloch leaders were vociferous in opposing the One Unit, but without much success.²⁴ The Khan of Kalat, who had been released, led another protest in 1958 but was arrested again. For around a year, the second Baloch insurgency continued under the leadership of Nawab Nouruz Khan, a championed Baloch tribal leader.²⁵

The third insurgency took place between 1962 and 1969 and partially stemmed from the lack of Baloch representation under the military regime of General Ayub Khan. Sardar Ataullah Mengal, a leader of the Mengal tribe in Balochistan, who later became Chief Minister under Bhutto’s rule, played a central role in the revolt. The uprising ended when General Yahya Khan took over and dissolved the One Unit system in 1970. In the same year Balochistan was declared a province.²⁶

By 1973 the economic and developmental inequalities between Balochistan and the rest of the country were evident. Income, educational and industrial progress remained stunted, many Baloch people felt excluded as Bhutto’s regime persisted with a centralization of power. Tension between the provincial government of the National Awami Party (NAP) and the central government took a turn for the worst when the central government blamed the NAP government for being anti-Pakistan and separatist, dismissed it and appointed Sardar Akbar Khan Bugti as Balochistan’s governor. The result was the fourth insurgency; a bloody uprising of Balochistan’s insurgents (mostly led by Mengal and Marri tribal leaders) against the PPP government at the center.²⁷ Adeel Khan, an Australian scholar of Pakistani descent, has aptly observed that the 1973–77 insurgency “was a war of political adventurism, rather than one of national liberation. It was a spontaneous response to the intervention of the central government and the undemocratic dismissal of an elected provincial government.”²⁸

The fifth confrontation between Baloch insurgents and the central government occurred under General Pervez Musharraf’s government. Baloch have generally been resentful of the armed forces in the area and the usage of Baloch natural resources by other communities while they remained


undeveloped. Therefore, when a dispute arose between Nawab Bugti and the central government, it quickly escalated and Nawab Bugti was killed during an army operation. The killing of the Nawab resulted in the spread and intensification of the insurgency in which several thousand men died.

As noted above, in the last three years, however, the federal government and the military appear to have opened doors of negotiations with Baloch leaders and although the insurgency has been showing signs of weakening, it may not end soon. In Balochistan, the challenge is that ethnic and sectarian conflict, civil-military tensions and armed rebellions continue to obscure the line between insurgency and terrorism. While a nebulous network of non-state actors exacerbates internal conflicts and magnifies externally sponsored proxy wars, the genuine spirit of any Baloch nationalist movement may have been lost. Irrespective of the causes of violence, the human loss has been colossal, a significant number of people have died and many continue to live with permanent injuries and psychological trauma. It is troubling to note that the stable functioning of the region’s societal life is hampered and continues to adversely affect peoples’ daily routines.


Between 2012 and 2015, Balochistan saw a rise in terrorist activity from 23 to 40 percent respectively. This rise was in contrast to what was happening in the provinces of Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where terrorist activity fell 55 and 59 per cent respectively.²⁹ During the past four years between 2013 and 2016 Quetta witnessed the death of 945 persons with over 1,700 injured, as Figure 7 shows.

Some sources disaggregate data according to the cause of political violence, indicating sectarian violence as a major cause of death and injury in Balochistan. According to *The South Asia Terrorism Portal*³⁰, in terms of sectarian violence in the province, Balochistan experienced a rise in both fatalities and injuries between 2011 and 2013, with recently a relative improvement in numbers (see Figure 6). Many of the victims are followers of the Shiite sect; in particular Hazara Shiites who are too often made targets of hate crime and violent religious extremism.

The issue of missing persons in Balochistan adds yet another dimension to the region’s security concerns. Patterns of abductions and kidnappings are both troubling and complex, exacerbating the human rights concerns in the province and across Pakistan. Estimates from NGOs in Balochistan



Data compiled from: South Asia Terrorism Portal³¹



Data compiled from: South Asia Terrorism Portal³⁴

put the figure of missing persons to up to 18,000 in number, claiming that around 2,000 of these died between 2001 and 2013.³² Locals have blamed intelligence agencies for these abductions, reasoning that a crackdown on 'nationalist insurgents' by the government itself has left the Baloch people with feelings of distrust and skepticism towards the state. For example, as mentioned above, the mishandling and the eventual killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti (August 26, 2006), a Baloch leader of national recognition and respect and with a wide support base, made the political situation even more problematic and unstable. Conspiracy theories insinuating his death to a somewhat mysterious and under reported (in Pakistani media) visit of BJP leader Jaswant Singh to Balochistan during the same month, further indicate how complicated Balochistan's political arena is, and the multiple layers of conflict that the province deals with on a daily basis.³³

As a result of the challenging environment of political violence in Balochistan, people have been forced to flee from their homes in search of safer abodes. Many choose to relocate to the metropolis of Quetta, with over 84,000 displaced living in makeshift camps in and around the city.

The frequency of terrorist attacks has made urban management especially difficult with effective social service delivery being increasingly problematic. Not only are communities unable to access the most basic necessities like clean drinking water and sanitation, but also a lack of quality health and education facilities significantly deters the development potential of the province. The following analysis provides an assessment of some of these issues.

THE TWIN CHALLENGES OF MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION

The processes of migration accompanied by accelerated rates of urbanization together act as an important dimension to Balochistan's urban development concerns. Taking Quetta as an example, the city's population density is rising, adding substantial pressure on limited financial, infrastructural and managerial resources.

Rural to Urban Migration and its impact on Quetta

Besides the exogenous drivers (e.g. Afghan wars), internal factors pushing migration towards Quetta city are equally potent. Rural to urban migration acts as an important contributing factor to the city's demographic change and urban growth. Rural-urban income differentials are noteworthy in the province and can greatly encourage rural populations to move to urban centres in search of higher incomes and better livelihoods. Prospects of employment, improved living standards and better quality public service delivery in cities act as strong pull factors. During the year 2012-2013, the most common reason of migration after marriage and for moving to live with family was that of employment or economic opportunity. 'Job transfer', 'new job opportunities' and 'search for a job' cumulatively account for 19 per cent of the reasons for migration in the province. Since Quetta is the only city of the province that has a relatively improved law and order situation, access to hospitals and schools, and some commerce and business activity, migrants from across the province are drawn towards it with expectations of improved life opportunities for their families. While Ziarat and Sibi may still have a better law and order situation, they do not provide the same livelihood opportunities that Quetta does.

The rate of migration to Quetta city has however been much higher compared to its rate of development. This has not only burdened the existing infrastructure of the city but has also caused a rapid *ruralization* of urban social and cultural life.


Despite the potential for progress that Quetta offers, the provincial and local governments, town planners and business groups in the city have not demonstrated the vision or agility to invest in its development.

As described earlier, *katachi abadis* (squatter settlements) have emerged disproportionately in and around Quetta putting enormous pressure on health, sanitation, housing and educational facilities available in the city. Nearly half of the city's inhabitants live in 47 of these *kachi abadis* with an average household size of 10.5 people.³⁵ The rapid growth and extension of squatter settlements is eroding the urban character of Quetta and unless the provincial government envisions a plan to overcome unplanned urban growth, the city could slide into further cycles of violence as a result of overcrowding and deteriorating infrastructure.

Social service delivery in Balochistan in general has been quite poor, especially in comparison to other provinces of Pakistan. Access to the most fundamental services such as quality health and education opportunities remains unacceptably limited. A lack of proper education infrastructure is particularly alarming. According to the *Balochistan Comprehensive Development Strategy 2013-2020*, less than half the number of communities settled in the province have a school present in the area. Additionally where schools are available, they are very poorly equipped and do not offer the most essential infrastructural needs. Figure 8 below illustrates some of these deficiencies.

Balochistan's performance on various health indicators isn't of much consolation either. Table 2 indicates the dire situation of the province's health progress; from the highest fertility rates in the country to the lowest immunization rates. Women and children in particular face the most challenges with regards to health services including serious issues with maternal and reproductive health.

As Balochistan's population rises, the scarce resources available in the province will undeniably be overburdened, affecting both the durability of infrastructure and the quality of service delivery.



Data compiled from: Balochistan Comprehensive Development Strategy 2013-2020

Table 2: Basic Health Indicators by Provinces, Pakistan 2012-13

| | Total Fertility Rate | Percent of children age 12-23 months fully vaccinated | Infant Mortality Rate (deaths/1000 live births) | Percentage of births assisted by a skilled provider | Median age at first birth for women age 25-49 (years) |
|--------------------|----------------------|---|---|---|---|
| Balochistan | 4.2 | 16 | 97 | 18 | 21.3 |
| Khyber Pakhtunkhwa | 3.9 | 53 | 58 | 48 | 21.7 |
| Punjab | 3.8 | 66 | 88 | 53 | 22.5 |
| Sindh | 3.9 | 29 | 74 | 61 | 21.9 |

Data compiled from: Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2012-13

Gender and Migration

Female migration from rural to urban areas is an emerging trend in Balochistan. Although a paucity of data makes it difficult to present dependable analyses, the Labor Force Surveys of 1996-2006 do show an increasing number of female migrants moving from rural to urban areas. The primary cause relates to the fact that many women accompany their spouses to urban cities after marriage. With more women moving to urban centres, policy needs to create an enabling environment that benefits from their participation in urban socioeconomic and political life. In particular, policies need to ensure greater representation of women in socio-political spheres where they are able to work towards improving female empowerment and agency. While Pakistan struggles in achieving greater gender parity in terms of employment, social service delivery, rights and justice, Balochistan in particular has a long history of patriarchy. Gradual change is nonetheless taking place. A 2014 study by Italian think tank *Instituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale* (ISPI) on Balochistan, for example, points out that ‘cultures of patriarchy’ are showing signs of weakening as men go missing, are injured or die in acts related to ethnic or sectarian terrorism, women are forced to migrate to urban centers. The report perceptively observes: “Emancipation should not come at price of such suffering, but the sad fact is sometimes it does.”³⁶ A well-thought out strategy, therefore, needs to be devised to improve the quality of life of women, particularly as female-headed-households grow in number. Women focused ini-

tiatives and social programs such as increased school enrollment, stipend based skill development, and increased access to microcredit and improved health infrastructure can substantially help their economic and social mobility, thus, making them ‘game changers’ in contributing towards economic development.

URBAN POLICY CONCERNS

Building Community Support

The inflow of migrants and rising population have led to an overburdening of limited natural resources in Balochistan, Quetta in particular. The indiscriminate and unplanned use of groundwater resources to meet water requirements has in recent years caused environmental degradation pushing Balochistan into into a situation of unsustainable development. Spreading squatter settlements and illegal use of groundwater are causing serious water shortages in Quetta and across the province. It is thus important to explore how the aspiration of the incoming migrants could be transposed into urban planning frameworks and the effective design of urban planning institutions. This is necessary in light of developments such as the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, which focuses on regions in Balochistan such as the Makran coastline including Gwadar.³⁷ In fact, as this project develops, more in-migration is forecasted to occur in Gwadar and the rest of Balochistan. There should therefore be negotiable and flexible arrangements in place that foster conciliatory relations between migrants of various ethnic and sectarian backgrounds, local communities and the incoming international workers. Without serious efforts towards building peacefully coexistent communities in Balochistan, the region will be neither able to fully participate nor maximize benefits from the various development projects that are coming in. This is even more important as the global economy moves towards greater dependence on factors such as regional integration and international connectivity.

Responding to External Shocks and Natural Disasters

Balochistan is prone to natural disasters and has had an unfortunate share of floods, earthquakes and other climatic catastrophes. These have resulted in great loss of lives, damage and destruction, which in turn has forced large-scale internal migration. Table 3 illustrates some of the recent natural disasters that have hit the province and the casualties that have resulted.

Disaster management efforts have however lacked effectiveness, at times due to the sheer scale of destruction but also because of poor coordination. The role and capacity of the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) must be enhanced to manage repercussions of such large-scale and recurring disasters. The various government bodies should work towards acquiring a pro-active

Table 3: Recent Natural Disasters in Balochistan

| | Deaths | Injuries |
|---|--------|----------------------------|
| Earthquake Awaran (2013) | 399 | 599 |
| Balochistan Floods (2013)* | 16 | 2 |
| Balochistan Earthquake Washuk (Mashkel) 2013. | 14 | 24 |
| Balochistan Floods 2010 | 50 | 5-10,000 families affected |

Data compiled from: Provincial Disaster Management Authority Balochistan and Dawn.com³⁸

**Data may vary according to news reports*

approach rather than a reactive one. Pre-emptive policies are necessary not only in terms of avoiding natural disasters that are frequent in Balochistan, but such policies can be critical in controlling for the effects of climate change that Pakistan is expected to experience as one of the top-ten most vulnerable countries.

This involves improving coordination between the Planning & Development Department of Balochistan, the Quetta Development Authority (QDA) and the Quetta Cantonment Board. This would imply developing coordination among the Local Government & Rural Development, Home Department (including the police), the Planning & Development and Finance Departments. Although government officials invariably claim that procedures are in place, in reality they remain ineffective and a number of overlapping functions need to be streamlined.

Data Availability

One of the major challenges of conducting research in Balochistan is paucity of data. The inconsistency and gaps in statistics is an impediment for conducting meaningful evidence-based research. Finding credible information on migration in general and internal migration is particularly a challenge, which undermines effective policy-making. The 1998 Census remains the only robust source, however it is quite dated being almost a decade and a half old. While other sources including the Labor Force Survey, the Integrated Household Survey and various UN databases are available, their scope remains limited, posing challenges to carrying out relevant and significant research. Under these conditions, most research relies on what may be called the best available data (BAD). Reliance on such data, owing to the difference in time span and context, makes it difficult to present a coherent picture of the migration and urbanization situation in Balochistan.

Moreover, research emanating from within Balochistan could give valuable insight to the development challenges of the province and possible solutions to overcome them. However the little literature authored locally tends to remain limited in reach, both because of the language used (most of these sources are in Urdu)³⁹ and the inability to disseminate studies to a wider and more diverse audience. This year the countrywide census has been initiated giving hope for the availability of more credible data in the coming years.

18TH AMENDMENT AND PROCESS OF DEVOLUTION

The twin challenges of migration and urbanization as important determinants of development in the province have put enormous pressure on the institutions of governance in Balochistan (PDMA, Home Department, Police, Local government and District administration to name a few). Questions over whether or not the federal and provincial governments have developed policy choices to manage the challenges that these twin issues create have become more pertinent than ever. There is growing evidence from global trends that cities are better managed and offer improved delivery of services if local governments are empowered and community participation is encouraged. Pakistan's history of local governments depicts that while military rulers have favored the idea of local governments, the civilian government has remained less responsive to it. Military rulers have used the local government as a tool to legitimize their authority. In 1979, by calling for local body elections, President Zia ul Haq tried to secure political legitimacy for his government through this system. Subsequently, General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) used the local government system to indicate democratic nature of his military rule (Local Government Ordinance 2001), once again promoting politics of patronage. Such installation of local governments created the illusion of a grassroots democratic

system that empowered the dispossessed and marginalized masses, therein providing validation and a moral, ethical and legal base to military regimes. The Pakistani experience reveals that as and when democracy is restored and the country makes a transition from the military to civilian regime; the civilian leadership shows scant interest in continuing with local governments. Following the 2008 and 2013 elections, it was with considerable reluctance that the provincial governments consented to new local government elections.

Indeed, it is the 18th Amendment that made it mandatory to hold local government elections and declared the local government as the third tier of the government (Article 140A). Balochistan was one of the first to pass the Local Government Act in 2010 while other provinces took an additional three years to do the same. Yet despite the passing of the Act, provincial government did not devolve enough power to the lower tier, including importantly, sufficient fiscal powers. Moreover, all four provincial governments have control over the decision to suspend or dismiss the head of an elected local government.⁴⁰ The intent of provincial leaders is clear. Instead of enhancing local government's authority, they have shown preference for resurrecting the colonial Commissionerate system, conceding minimal financial and administrative powers to elected local government officials.

Balochistan once again took lead in holding local body elections in 2013. This, however, did not mean that actual authority was devolved. In fact, the provincial government have usurped the rights and control of the local governments. In Pakistan, the architecture of the local government system has historically been such that it endorses patronage-based politics (allowing the state to provide patronage to the electables in the rural and tribal setting of the country). While the 18th Amendment provides an opportunity to empower the provinces and local governments and build their capacity, its effective implementation remains a challenge. In relation to migration and urbanization, obstacles to effective enforcement of the 18th Amendment must be overcome to adequately respond to the needs of Balochistan's migrant population and their relationship to the local economy. A bottom-up approach as instructed by the 18th Amendment is therefore necessary for the overall progress of the province. Here local-level knowledge of migrant communities, their role in urban development and the diverse ways of managing migrant-local interactions can be instrumental in formulating effective policy design. In fact, such an approach would benefit from indigenous knowledge and participation of the local community as compared to one where higher tiers of government design policy from afar.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The foregoing analysis draws the conclusion that reform of governance institutions is critical to manage the ramifications of migration and urbanization. It points towards the absence of a holistic urban planning framework that could deal with pressures of incoming migrants on housing, sanitation, health and education services. It underscores the importance of interdepartmental coordination and capacity building of government institutions such as the PDMA. The analysis also advocates for practical implementation of the 18th Amendment as a pivotal instrument for effective management of urbanization and migration in the province of Balochistan, particularly in the city of Quetta. Based on this assessment it recommends the following steps for consideration:

1. The federal and provincial governments need to intensify consultative processes to reformulate security policies and improve governance institutions for effective law enforcement, enhancing prosecution procedures and strengthening the role of the criminal justice systems to curb violence and religious extremism. Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in the country, especially the police, must be appropriately equipped and trained to deal with terrorist activities, suicide

bombings and incidents of abductions. In 2014, the government of Pakistan announced a comprehensive National Internal Security Policy (NIPS), to combat terrorism and extremism and to develop effective coordination among various counter terrorism departments.⁴¹ Its implementation, however, remains weak. Operationalizing the NIPS framework and developing effective coordination should thus be prioritized. The Balochistan Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) must also be energized and adequately equipped. Addressing security concerns in the province is a pre-requisite for the province's overall welfare and paramount to Balochistan's overall development trajectory.

2. Migration responsive policies should be designed to reflect migrants' social, economic and cultural needs. Consequently, urban planning deserves to be guided by incoming migrants' housing and settlement requirements as well as encourage their acclimatization and assimilation to their adopted homes. Additionally, building partnership between the PDMA, the local government and migrant communities is pivotal. A deeper understanding of the causes of migration, migrant's home places and the multi-dimensional consequences of internal and external migration will aid in formulating sustainable policies. This will improve and enhance urban governance and town planning, economic development and eventually even Balochistan's security situation. In that spirit it would be equally important to improve the institutional capacity and human resource quality of government institutions such as the PDMA, simultaneously building linkages between local government bodies and the provincial government departments for urgent support from the community. Simultaneously, recognising that climate change is real and happening, in addition to incidents of high-risk earthquakes and floods that occur in the province.
3. In March 2017 the sixth country wide census has finally begun. The completion of the census should lead to setting up of data collection units that provide comprehensive and reliable statistics is fundamental to enable evidence-based policy making in Balochistan. Similarly establishing interprovincial linkages and networks of information sharing between various government departments will play a significant role in creating reliable databases for effective analyses. Collaborative and integrated efforts of data collection by various departments and institutions should therefore be facilitated and encouraged.
4. The local government system is installed but it must be empowered and a shared vision between local and provincial governments needs to be established. The unwillingness of the provinces to devolve and the tendency to retain the Commissionerate system must be carefully reviewed. A shared vision on the functioning of the Provincial Finance Commission and the local government must be re-designed as well. A well-functioning system of local governance would allow for an improved ability and capacity of the administration to manage urbanization and migration inflows.
5. Inclusive public policies that provide equal opportunities to participate in public life, regardless of ethnic and religious background, need to be formulated. Affirmative action should be taken in particular for the benefit of marginalized minority communities. This demands an urban policy for Balochistan that takes a holistic view of health, housing, education, water and sanitation needs of the urban centers. The provincial parliament is empowered to formulate laws and could provide the leadership in developing a regulatory framework for that purpose. Members of Balochistan assembly could be helped and assisted (by the experts and support from the relevant departments) in playing more vigorous role in designing a regulatory framework for migrants and urban planning. It merits attention that the government needs to employ extra care and scrutiny while issuing identity cards or documentation of origin from areas in Balochistan such as Gwadar. This is necessary to protect indigenous inhabitants and their political representation at various levels of governance. This is also important to ensure community

- participation and ownership in the development process of Balochistan.⁴²
6. Provincial and local governments must develop a shared agenda for promoting social harmony, protecting rights and enhancing the economic welfare of all ethnic communities in Balochistan. Securing projects like the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Maritime Strategies demand a socially peaceful, economically robust and politically stable Balochistan. That calls for showing respect for the Baloch culture and assuring both the powerful and the marginalized groups in Balochistan that their rights and interests are defended, protected and promoted. Ensuring the success of these seemingly paradoxical policies will depend on concerted action and partnership among political parties--inclusive of tribal leaders, bureaucracy, intellectuals, researchers, businesses, religious groups, and the civil society.

Notes

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2. Saeed Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).
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4. Anthropologist Nina Swidler explains this by dichotomizing, 'nationalist narratives' with 'Baloch ethnicities' and linking these with larger global forces, she insightfully observes: "The border between oppositional ethnicity and aggressive nationalism is unstable; it is shaped according to the ways in which global and state forces intersect with the cultural and material resources of local populations". Nina Swidler, "Beyond Parody: Ethnography Engages Nationalist Discourse." In *Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan*, ed. Paul Titus (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 188.
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12. Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. "Percentage Distribution Of Migrant Population 10 Years Of Age And Over By Place Of Present And Previous Residence, Area, Sex And Provinces 2014-15" under 'Labour Force Survey 2014-15 (Annual Report),' http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/Labour%20Force/publications/lfs2014_15/t12-pak.pdf (accessed February 23, 2017).
13. The district of Quetta consists of three tehsils: Saddar, Quetta City and Kuchlak, and 67 union councils. See also the Government of Balochistan website for a historical perspective of the district's administrative development: http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=801&Itemid=1087
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19. Ibid.
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- ³² Kiran Nazish, "Balochistan's Missing Persons," *The Diplomat* (January 2014), <http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/balochistans-missing-persons/> (accessed February 27, 2017).
- ³³ Jaswant Singh, former Finance and Foreign Minister of India paid an extended visit to Balochistan in August 2006, ostensibly visiting the ancient Hindu temple of Mata Hinglaj. His visit raised eyebrows for those who couldn't comprehend why a high profile politician from India such as Singh was allowed to visit the volatile heartland of Balochistan. [See Tarun Vijay, "A Devi in Balochistan," *The Times of India*, (August 2009) <http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indus-calling/a-devi-in-balochistan/> (accessed March 4, 2017) for more details of his pilgrimage]. For another side of the story that led to the killing of Nawab Bugti, is the case of Dr. Shazia, who was posted in Dera Bugti as a medical doctor and allegedly manhandled or raped by an army captain. Dr. Shazia reported the matter to Bugti, who following tribal tradition, provided her shelter and asked the army to hand over the captain to him, so that he could be brought to justice. The army refused and aggravated relations between the military and Bugti, eventually leading to his killing. [For details see, Dr. Zafar Ullah *Balochistan: Aap Bittee* (Self-Story)(Quetta: Kalat Publishers, 2013), 137-147.- an Urdu publication, which in these pages builds on the conspiracy surrounding Bugti's killing.]
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- ³⁶ Zofia Mroczk, "A New Society in Pakistani Balochistan," *ISPI*, no.266 (July 2014), http://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/analysis_266_2014.pdf (accessed March 12, 2017), 8.
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- ⁴¹ The NIPS document is available on the National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan (NACTA) website, at <http://NACTA.gov.pk/>. See also http://NACTA.gov.pk/Download_s/Rules/030314_NISP_ConceptPaper.pdf.
- ⁴² Tariq Khosa, "Gwadar the Tiger", *Dawn*, 1 April 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1324001/gwadar-the-tiger> (accessed 2 April 2017).
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


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




- As an academic institution, it imparts quality education based on an innovative curriculum designed with domestic needs in mind.
- As a policy think tank, it conducts applied and evidence-based research to inform the policy process. In addition, it organizes academic conferences, seminars & workshops for advocacy and raising awareness on public policy issues.
- As a training institute, it devises and conducts short term skills oriented trainings for public sector professionals.

CPPG Publications

Monographs



Reports



Quarterly



Dialogue Report



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