

Exclusivist Ethno-Nationalism and the Future of Federalism in Pakistan

Mohammad Younis*, Aisha Shahzad**

Abstract

Pakistan is an ethnically diverse country with multiple ethno-nationalist communities living in different constituent units where geographical boundaries are not congruent with the ethnic identities. The heterogeneous and diverse nature of Pakistan's population, since independence, has served as an impediment to the 'cause of nation building' or a single 'Pakistani National Identity instead of providing strength to the state apparatuses,' The 'exclusivity' of these sub-national or ethnic groups has resulted in the non-permeability, and consequently, created hindrances for these groups to co-opt with each other in order to emerge as one single and coherent identity. Different sub-national groups reside in all provinces of Pakistan which include Pashtuns and Baloch in Baluchistan, amongst others, Muhajirs and Sindhis, primarily, both reside in the Sindh province, Punjab has both Punjabi and Saraiki communities, amongst others and Pashtuns and Kohistani Hazaras (not to be confused with the distinct ethnic Hazara tribe of Baluchistan and Afghanistan), reside in KP. All these sub-national/ethnic groups consider themselves distinct from the other groups, on many different grounds, and have resisted integration into each other to form one national identity as a Pakistani. The densely populated province of Punjab, which at the time of inception of the country was the second biggest province, started dominating the civil and military decision/policy making circles in the nascent phase of post partition state development, subjugating and alienating the majority province of East Pakistan leading to its ultimate secession. This historically imbalanced federal setup resulted in the aggravation of the grievances of smaller constituent units as well, and strengthened their demands for provincial autonomy giving rise to ethno-nationalist and separatist movements in the provinces of Baluchistan, KP, Sindh. The people's representative's responded to these demands of provincial autonomy by amending the constitution in 2010 and attempted to improve its federal credentials. The aim of this paper will be to highlight the future prospects for federalism in Pakistan by looking at how the political system is trying to cope with the diverse society of Pakistan and the foremost challenges that the federal system is facing.

Key word: Ethno Nationalist, Federalism, Marginalized Communities, Constitutional Institutions, 18th Amendment

This article can be cited as:

Younis M., Shehzad A., (2017). Exclusivist Ethno-Nationalism and the Future of Federalism in Pakistan Journal of Arts and Social Sciences 4(2), 85-101.

* Muhammad Younis Assistant Prof. Department of Political Science F.C College University, Lahore

** Aisha Shahzad Assistant Prof. Department of Political Science Lahore College for Women University, Lahore

Introduction

Joseph Stalin defined a nation as “a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of common language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup manifested in a common culture” (Ozkirimli, 2005). For him, it was sufficient for any one of these characteristics to be missing for a nation to cease to exist. It is the exclusive nature of these characteristics that actually divide people in different ethno-national groups where they distinguish themselves as unique and different and see each other in an adversarial ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dynamic. The characteristics mentioned in the definition above are referred to as objective markers; which do not themselves make up nations. Rather according to the subjective definition of a nation, these markers are necessary to generate the feeling of commonality, but, more importantly, it is the ‘self-awareness’ among the members of a particular group about their uniqueness vis-à-vis others that helps create or sustain nations.

Literature Review:

Exclusivist ethno-nationalism refers to the compartmentalization among different entities while living in the same territory. If these entities fail to develop social capital or attributes of integration to accommodate each other, they eventually result in isolationism, with deeply entrenched boundaries demarcated among distinct ethnic groups. Different thinkers, such as Max Weber and Marx enlist multiple reasons that create ethno-nationalist crises such as modernization, colonial legacies, forced assimilation, uneven development, social fragmentation and histories of authoritarianism. Every ethnic group has a sense of ethnic honor but when it is victimized in terms of less- privileges and non-inclusive policies from the center, it ends up feeling marginalized whilst still being a part of the larger whole.

In this context, the process of national integration in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society like Pakistan must involve careful constitutionalism, acknowledgment of diversities and cautious decentralization, which depends upon mutual agreements between the ruling elite and different segments of the society. Hence, the significance of federalism becomes more significant. The federal system must embody the fundamental ingredients to foster a democratic and participatory political culture diffusing ethnic conflicts while generating ethnic inclusivism. Federalism is the only appropriate measure to harmonize inter-provincial and intra-provincial

disparities. Federalism also requires suitable measures for devolution of powers and inclusive approach on the part of the ruling elite and the constitutional dictates.

The proponents of inclusive federalism including Livingston (1956) and Wheare (1950) emphasize upon certain elements which are required for the smooth operationalization of federalism in a heterogeneous society. According to them, a federal structure needs constitutional guarantees regarding the proportional share of financial resources between federal and provincial governments. Similarly, all federating units are supposed to have equitable right to share fiscal resources under some constitutional formula to avoid discrepancies amongst them. Federalism is more appropriate for the third world states as compared to unitary systems. But it needs the spirit of power sharing while forming grand alliances or coalition governments in order to incorporate all ethnic entities.

Moreover, federal systems are strengthened by the independence of judiciary, rule of law, transparency and a robust system of accountability. In fact, the success of a federal system lies in its viability, quantum of space given to various ethnic strata, system of conflict management and a broad based consensus on regional and federal issues. If multi-ethnic societies do not reflect trends of liberalism, congruity and social cohesiveness then the foundation of federalism becomes fragile resulting into vicious circles of centralization and the domination of elite on state resources which aggravate ethnic antagonism.

Gurr (1994) describes certain obstacles to the resolution of ethno-political problems. According to him the identity issues are not easy to negotiate because no ethnic community can make any compromise at the cost of its identity. That's why these issues become intractable. He recommends that the interests of all ethnic groups are supposed to be managed in a balance way to prevent sustained violence. It needs pluralism, consociationalism and reconciliation.

Research Questions:

1. How does heterogeneity impede the national cohesion in a state like Pakistan?
2. Did relative deprivation dwindle the federal structure in Pakistan?
3. How did the propensity of authoritarianism in the political system cause ethnic divisiveness and combativeness?
4. What are the future prospects of federalism in Pakistan after eighteenth amendment?

Objectives of Research:

1. To expound the political dynamics which obstruct national cohesion.
2. To explicate the socio-economic factors, contributing to centrifugal forces.

3. To identify the authoritarianism, predominant in the political system.
4. To envisage the implications of eighteenth amendment in the federal structure of Pakistan.

Methodology and Data Sources:

This article contains qualitative research design to encompass the phenomenon of exclusivist ethno-nationalism in Pakistan and the future possibilities in the federal settings under eighteenth amendment. Primary data is collected through interviews of the senators. Secondary sources include books, journals and newspapers.

Themes for Interview:

Major Themes	Sub Themes
1. Heterogeneity and nation-building in Pakistan.	Relative deprivation among federal entities.
2. Authoritarian trends in politics.	Prospects of eighteenth amendment.

Demographic Profile of Respondents:

Code No.	Respondents
1.	Senator from Punjab
2.	Senator from Sindh
3.	Senator from Khyber Pukhtun Khawa
4.	Senator from Baluchistan

Federalism in Pakistan - Trend Analysis

The general structure of government in Pakistan was envisioned to be federal from the onset. This arrangement was necessitated by at least three socio-historical factors according to Professor (Jaffrelot, 2004). Firstly, The All India Muslim League, the founding political party of Pakistan, always championed the case of provincial autonomy in British India and consequently, in any future administrative settlement for major groups. While the group identity envisioned by Muslim league was solely based on religion, ethnic divisions within these groups were completely ignored. This misreading of the ethnic divisions within the areas that were to comprise Pakistan has had severe adverse consequences over the years. The common strand of

the strong commitment of the Muslim League to the provincial autonomy project can be observed in the positions assumed by its top leadership at the Lucknow pact - 1916, Jinnah's Fourteen Points – 1929 and subsequent arguments during the Round Table Conferences – 1930, rhetoric employed in the 1937 provincial election campaigns leading up to the historic Lahore Resolution in 1940 and the acceptance of Cabinet Mission Plan – 1946, amongst other critical historical junctures. Simultaneously, the Muslim league always advocated a group identity based around religion, which ultimately led to a separatist freedom movement.

Secondly, the modulation of the partition of British India also necessitated that both the newly independent states, Pakistan and India, would benefit from operating under a federal form of government

The heterogeneous nature of the Pakistani society, if observed at the time of the partition, in terms of ethnicity, language and cultural diversity itself necessitated a federal arrangement in matters of power sharing. Only a decentralized federal setup could accommodate the socioeconomic imbalances between the federating units, and within the units themselves. But unfortunately ethnic dichotomies were accentuated right after the partition. The Punjabi-Muhajir dominated military and civil bureaucratic elite have always been shying away of establishing a pragmatic, participatory and inclusive political framework that could accommodate diverse ethnic entities.

Moreover the constitutional history of Pakistan has kept manifesting trends of authoritarianism. The Indian Independence Act 1947 was adopted as an interim constitution and reflected strong trends of centralization the subsequent constitutions of 1956 and 1962 continued to retain a strong center. The romance with a sole dictator ruling under the garb of a democratic but cosmetic constitution still carries on.

Linguistic heterogeneity caused watertight compartmentalization in the federation of Pakistan (Khan 2009). East Pakistan was linguistically homogenous while the Western Wing had diverse languages i.e. Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushto, Seraiki, Brahvi, Hindko, Baluchi, amongst others. Bengalis went to the extent of accommodating Urdu as a national language along with Bengali which truly was the language of the majority. On the other hand, the supporters of Urdu language propagated that single language would foster uniformity, a consequence of Aligarh elitism.

However the Constituent Assembly in 1955 passed the language bill whereby both Urdu and Bengali were declared national languages. The bill also recognized the importance of regional languages by empowering the provincial governments to take necessary steps for the promotion of regional cultures and languages.

Then, the federation of Pakistan had asymmetrical representation of the constituent units in the government ministries and provincial departments. The following data shows the disproportionate representation of Eastern and Western wings.

The provinces in Pakistan manifested acute contradictions in terms of economic development. The constitutions of (1956, 1962) did not promote provincial autonomy which generated mistrust between the central government and the federating units. These disparities lasted for a longer period and ultimately resulted in the disintegration of the federation of Pakistan in 1971.

These disparities posed a serious threat to the existence of other ethnic communities. The preponderance of West Pakistan over the East Pakistan and after 1971 the hegemony of Punjab over the smaller units actually has made Pakistan a competitive federation rather than a co-operative federation. Diversities were not acknowledged by the ruling elite. This situation aggravated the racial, ethnic and communal animosities.

Although Pakistan became a federation in letter, the ruling elites, in spirit, failed to run the state according to the established norms of federal constitutionalism. We will now view some explanations by different scholars on the reasons for the debacle of the concept of federalism in Pakistani context.

The democratic aspirations of the founding fathers of the nascent state were crushed by the juggernaut of the civil and military bureaucracy who assumed a preponderant role in the power configurations that ruled the country. The interests of the civil-military bureaucratic elite ran contrary to the interests of a political leadership trying to emancipate themselves and the people. The fact that the overdeveloped bureaucracies were already entrenched in the power dynamics historically through instruments employed by the colonial elites aided this development. There is also another argument that the anti-federalist and Punjab centric mindset of the ruling elites, coupled with the aforementioned dominance of the civil-military bureaucratic oligarchy, curtailed the evolution of federalism in Pakistan in the institutional context.

Difference of opinion and dissidence in the nascent state were out rightly rejected by the ruling elites under the hypocritical garb of an attempt to protect the Islamic nationalism project.

Religious groups, marginalized in the political sphere, with meager populist support were pitted against ethnic demands to support the self-servicing ends of the ruling establishment. The Objectives Resolution – 1949 provided that space by institutionalizing the role of Islam in body politic of the country. The state was indirectly centralized through the use of Islamic rhetoric. The voices of the weaker federating units and marginalized societal groups were crushed as space for democratic dissent was curtailed. The constitution making process was delayed for nine years, significantly reducing the representative and legislative role of the elected institutions of the state.

Pakistan, unlike many post-colonial states, lacked continuity in terms of a political center. Everything ranging from establishing the seat of government to the provision of institutional structures for financial stability, government coordination, tax collection and distribution, to name only a few, had to be constructed from scratch. Moreover, there was a perceived and to some extent, a real security threat from neighboring India. This facilitated a decisive role for a central government equipped with strong military muscle. The security problems coupled with newly emerging realities of the bipolar dynamics of the Cold War severely affected the governance strategy making Pakistan a highly centralized and, often, paranoid state immediately after independence.

The Muslim league and especially its political elite from non-Pakistan areas, and the Muslim members of Indian bureaucracy who chose to join Pakistan were not very jovial about the increased role of the Bengalis and smaller provinces in the western Pakistan especially when the modalities for the country were put in practice. This mistrust was one of the major reasons for the enhancement of the power of the central government as opposed to the provincial autonomy project. The politics of a few months preceding partition determined substantially the governing arrangements of the new state which were essentially centralized and autocratic.

The Objective Resolution - 1949 can also be considered one of the root causes for strengthening central government. It institutionalized the role of religion in the politics of Pakistan. Religious parties, completely marginalized, owing to their anti-Pakistani role during the independent movement, were emboldened by the passage of the resolution. In the backdrop of this resolution they presented their charter of demands to be incorporated in the new constitution while presenting themselves as the sole authorities which could interpret religion. They started interfering in the matters of running the state openly while negatively influencing the political discourse in the constituent assembly through the backdoors.


The accession of Balochistan, especially the state of Qalat to Pakistan also raised many questions as to the nature of federalism in Pakistan. Many Baloch intellectuals still believe that it was a coerced, rather than a voluntary accession. The unfortunate saga took a violent turn when the brother of the Khan of Qalat took up arms against the state of Pakistan. The way he was treated also left many scars in the memories of Baloch people. Though a commission was constituted on Balochistan issue, its recommendations were never given due consideration. Baloch nationalists still remember their history with Pakistan as a tale of broken promises and blatant state aggression by the center. Balochistan has experienced at least four full-fledged military operations if we exclude the current ongoing battle between separatist insurgents and the military establishment.

It can however be perceived that the geographic entity named Pakistan has always been ethnically diverse with multiple ethno-nationalist communities living in different constituent units. But ironically the heterogeneous and diverse nature of Pakistan's population instead of giving strength to the federation has rather served as an impediment to the 'cause of nation building' or a single 'Pakistani national identity'. The willful 'exclusivity' of these subnationalities or ethnic groups has resulted in non-permeability, and therefore, created hindrances for these groups to co-exist with each other in order to emerge as one single and coherent identity.

The four provinces of Pakistan comprise various sub nationalities; Baluchistan, for example, is home to both Pashtuns and Baloch, amongst others, Muhajirs and Sindhis, primarily reside in the Sindh province, Punjab has Punjabis, Saraikis, Pathans and Afghan communities, and the Pashtuns and Hazaras, amongst others reside in KP. All these sub-national/ethnic groups consider themselves distinct on different grounds, from the other groups and have been actively resisting their integration into each other to form a singular and homogenous Pakistani national identity.


East-West Representation in the Military Office Class of Pakistan 1955-56

East-West Representation in the Military Office Class
of Pakistan 1955-56




Source: Adeney, K. (2007). *Federalism and ethnic conflict regulation in India and Pakistan*. USA: Praeger Publisher.

Number of Civil Service Officers on Influential Positions 1965-70




Source: Saeed, K.B. (1980). *Politics in Pakistan (the nature and direction of change)*. USA: Praeger Publisher.

Comparison of Per Capita Income among Provinces 1976




Source: Burki, S.J (1980). *State and society in Pakistan*. London: Macmillan Publisher.



Source: Lambert, R.D. (1959). "Factors in Bengali regionalism in Pakistan" *Far East Survey*, 28 (4), 49-58.

The federation of Pakistan faced the challenge of non-democratic political culture. The following data shows such trends.

Representation of East and West Pakistan in Each Cabinet



	15 Aug 1947 16 Oct 1951	19 Oct 1951 17 Apr 1953	17 Apr 1953 24 Oct 1954	24 Oct 1954 11 Aug 1955	11 Aug 1955 12 Sep 1956	12 Sep 1956 18 Oct 1957	18 Oct 1957 16 Dec 1957	16 Dec 1957 7 Oct 1958
■ East Pakistan	6	6	5	7	7	8	7	12
■ West Pakistan	13	9	9	9	10	6	9	15

Source: Mahmood, S. (1993). *Pakistan divided: study of the factors and forces leading to the leadership of Pakistan 1971*. Lahore: Jang Publishers.

The Pakistani state has visibly failed to introduce or effectively define and implement processes for national integration on the attributes of a modern state and has relied only on religion as a tool to provide the basis for its identity. Frequent intervention of military in political decision making processes, inexperienced political leadership and strategic compulsions did not allow for mutually agreed identity parameters and a balanced federation to operate in Pakistan.

The state and government have been responding off and on to these demands of provincial autonomy by amending the constitution and attempting to structure it on a federal model. However, even the 18th amendment, the most serious effort in this regard in Pakistani constitutional history, while aiming at the maximum devolution of powers to the constituent units has yet to completely address the ground realities due to lack of capacity of different

provincial institutions in the underdeveloped federating units and as well as due to economic and social disparities amongst and within these provinces.

Fiscal Federalism under the 18th Amendment

The National Finance Commission Award under the PML and PPP governments (1991 and 1996) was agreed upon the basis of consensus. In 1996, Nawaz Sharif enhanced the share of the province from 28% to 45% of the national divisible revenue. Punjab received 57.88%, Sindh 23.28%, NWFP, now KPK 13.54% and Baluchistan 5.3%. Musharraf's regime failed to develop the much needed consensus therefore chose to impose it in 2006. Under that arrangement the provincial share was kept at the same 45% of the divisible pool while providing for 1% increase per annum reaching at 50% in the next five years.

A major breakthrough in fiscal federalism was achieved under the coalition government led by the Pakistan People's Party. The share of provinces under 7th NFC award was increased from 47% to 50% of the divisible pool for 2010-2011 and 57.5% for the following four years. Progressive criteria for the award benefited the provinces immensely (Amjad, 2010). Factors such as poverty, revenue generation and inverse population density, in addition to population, were recognized for the determination of award. The award also changed the ratio of the provincial share, Punjab - 51.74%, Sindh - 24.55%, NWFP - 14.62% and Baluchistan - 9.09%.

The 18th amendment has made it obligatory that the share of a province in the new award would never be less than what it was receiving earlier. There is also a provision for the annual monitoring of the implementation of the award. The Monitoring Report has to be presented to National and Provincial assemblies. The provinces can raise loans to expand their revenue generation base. The 7th NFC award has paved the way for rebuilding and strengthening fiscal federalism in Pakistan.

There is a provision for National Finance Commission, under Article 160 of the Constitution of Pakistan, to transfer resources from the federal divisible pool to the provinces. The commission is not only responsible for vertical distribution i.e. the total share of all the provinces in the divisible pool, but also the horizontal distribution i.e. the share that each province enjoys.

The Council of Common Interests was created in the 1973 Constitution and was proposed because it could harmonize relations between the center and the units, serving as an intergovernmental institution for negotiation. However, with the roller-coaster ride between

civilian and military rule, the institution remained ineffective at best, if its performance is gauged in the lens of conflict resolution, with only 11 meetings being held from 1973-2009. In theory, the 18th amendment empowered the CCI in ways never ever imagined before.

The CCI is mandated to formulate and regulate policies respecting the 22 matters enumerated in Part II of the Federal Legislative List (FLL) and exercise supervision and control over related institutions including: national planning and national economic coordination, including planning and coordination of scientific and technological research; supervision and management of public debt; legal, medical and other professions; standards in institutions for higher education and research; electricity; and inter-provincial matters and coordination. The federal government can only legislate on subjects in Part II of the FFL after consultation with the provinces through the CCI. CCI's members are the prime minister (who cannot delegate his role to a minister), the chief ministers of the four provinces and three representatives of the federal government nominated by the prime minister. CCI meetings are to occur at least once every 90 days and are to be chaired by the prime minister. Decisions are by simple majority. The Council is to have a permanent secretariat with representation from all the provinces and regions based on quotas.

Consequences of the 18th Amendment

The massive devolution of items of power on the central list to the provinces has created further challenges. The performance of the provinces in this regard has been sketchy at best - their lack of capacity in handling education, health, energy and other important sectors related to public sector development has been exposed (Yang, 2010). The main victim has been law and order where the provinces failed to allocate adequate resources.

The failure to create empowered local government institutions through devolution of fiscal powers, even after the elections of these bodies, reflects a structural democratic deficit in formal constitutional terms. All provincial governments have amended their respective Local Bodies Acts in an attempt to render them totally ineffective. Local bodies do not have any real autonomy in matters such as education and health. This approach of the legislators is itself a sign of the hangover being suffered as a result of historically operating under the tutelage of non-democratic forces and being resistant to change. **Thematic analysis of interviews.**

Implications of 18th Amemmdment.

Theme – 1

R – 1

Heterogenous societies like Pakistan can only survive if they develop sense of accommodation, trust, social, capital and political efficacy. Unfortunately in Pakistan the process of national integration had been fragmented due to the denial of ethnic diversities. We had experienced the separation of Bengal in 1971 mainly due to the weak centre – province relations, ethno o nationalism and discontentment over the distribution of resources. Certainly the problem lies in the non – realization of the peripheral areas i.e. remote areas in Southern Punjab and Balochistan etc.

R– 2

As far as the process of national cohesion in Pakistan is concerned the successive governments in the past have been constrained due to the ethnic compartmentalization, political maneuvering and practorian influence. Our federal system done not reflect the true spirit of 1973 constitution specially in respect of decentralization, sustainable democracy and institutional jurisdiction. Socio – economic disparities could not be bridged because the political system vehemently entrenched by the forces of authoritarianism, non – consociationalism and provincialism.

R-3

Though 18th amendment was aimed to promote fiscal decentralization but there are certain reservations like fiscal framework regarding macro-economic indicators. If the provincial govt doesn't meet set targets i.e. revenue collection then the federal govt doesn't share the burden of the province. This situation creates complications for the provincial governments and then they curtail the budget of local units which affect the performance of the local bodies. Infect provinces as well as the federal governments should opt pragmatic strategies for resource mobilization and the enhancement of tax-net.

R-4

Apparently 18th amendment seems to provide immense powers to the provincial governments but the implementation of this amendment in true letter and spirit needs more passionate commitment. If the governments don't make sure the meaningful execution of this amendment then it would bring more frustration among the deprived communities like Seraikies in Punjab and there is a possibility to vent their grievances through violence.

Theme – 2

R – 1

18th amendment could not be successfully ensured decentralization or provincial autonomy. It kept condoned regarding the inclusion of all ethnic minorities in the state structure. Similarly 18th amendment did not increase the powers of senate especially in terms of monetary affairs.

R – 2

18th amendment is a milestone to strengthen democracy in Pakistan. It empowered the parliament but there are certain reservations regarding the appointment of judges through judicial commission and the parliamentary committee makes the whole process politicized. The condition that only the senior most judges can become the chief justice is also objectionable. Similarly the issue of seraikistan has not been discussed under this amendment expect few parliamentarians spoke for this issue.

R-3

18th amendment would have been able to empower the provinces in order to ensure an inclusive growth. But the current political and economic framework needs more prudent planning significantly to ignite economic growth. Federal government should have collaborative plan of action to include all social sectors i.e. health, education and infrastructural development in the province. Having said that the federal government should not demarcate logic- tight compartments between provinces and the central government because provinces are not capable enough to achieve certain goals i.e. poverty alleviation to overcome inter-provincial or intraprovincial disparities. Moreover there is a need to increase the capacity of provincial finance departments.

R-4

Certainly 18th amendment contributed to deter autocratic trends in the federation of Pakistan. This initiative was necessary to safeguard the entrenched political system of Pakistan. Here the need of the hour is to mitigate the military influence in politics.

Conclusion

The journey of the project of federalism in Pakistan has been tumultuous – and the performance of Pakistan if gauged under federal indicators, terrible, historically - but its validity as the basic governing mechanism has never been questioned. Pakistan, to many scholars, took a wrong start by promoting the administrative institutions such as military and bureaucracy at the

expense of representative and political institutions. In the historical milieu of a glaring democratic deficit in the founding political party, the decisions taken by the founding father after the inception of the state, amongst other factors, Pakistan's experience with federalism was severely tortuous. By the time the country got divided as the Eastern wing parted ways, the overwhelming preponderance of the Punjabi centric ruling establishment was deeply entrenched with the smaller provinces marginalized and their grievances heightened. The 1973 Constitution, which is still the basic constitutional framework for Pakistan, albeit with massive overhauls through amendments, was based around a broad political consensus and went a long way in rationalizing federal contours for state running. In the decades that followed, extra-constitutional martial laws and hybrid quasi-democratic regimes enjoyed power – to the detriment of the federal project. It was only in 2009, after the passage of the 18th amendment to the constitution of Pakistan, that a semblance of civilian and parliamentary preponderance could be observed, in relative terms, as provincial autonomy was increased, the project of fiscal decentralism moved in a progressive direction and inter-governmental and representative institutions were empowered. But there is no end game in the democratic consolidation and accommodation of various ethnic groups' project, as well as federalism – and the Pakistani state still needs to negotiate carefully with the challenges, as well as opportunities provided by the major overhaul post-18th amendment. While the 18th amendment can be lauded for its spirit in giving the provinces their due share thereby empowering them, its implementation has been sketchy at best. And that is where the real battle lies – for legislators, as well as the ethnic heterogeneity presented in the citizenry of Pakistan. In fact sincere efforts are needed to guarantee the implementation of this amendment in a real sense.

References

- Adeney, K. (2007). *Federalism and ethnic conflict regulation in India and Pakistan* (1sted.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ali, M. (1996). *Politics of federalism in Pakistan* (1sted.). Karachi: Royal Book Co.
- Humayun, S. (1995). *Sheikh Mujib's 6-Point formula* (1sted.). Karachi: Royal Book.
- Jaffrelot, C. (2004). *A history of Pakistan and its origins* (1sted.). London: Anthem Press.
- Khan, H. (2009). *Constitutional and political history Of Pakistan* (1sted.). Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Livingston, W.S. (1956). *Federalism and constitutional change*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Mahmood, S. (1993). *Pakistan divided* (1sted.). Kazi Publications.

- Özkirimli, U. (2005). *Contemporary debates on nationalism* (1sted.). Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rashid, A. (Winter, 2010). Fiscal decentralization: Empowering the provinces, strengthening the federation. *The Pakistan Development Review*, 49(4), pp. 279-282.
- Sayeed, K.B. (1980). *Politics in Pakistan: the nature and directions of change*. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Wheare, K.C. (1950). *Federal government*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Yang, C. (Summer, 2010). Ending Dictatorship: Pakistan's Eighteenth Amendment. *Harvard International Review*, 32(2), pp. 10-11

Guidelines for Contributors

Submission of Manuscripts

Manuscripts (two double spaced hard copies) should not exceed 10,000 words (including endnotes and references). Manuscripts should be typed, double-spaced using Times New Roman font size 12. Citations should conform to APA 6th edition documentation styles. The language of presentation should be English. Electronic submissions are to be made with Microsoft Word, with the file name clearly indicated. Each manuscript should be accompanied by an abstract of not more than 250 words. All works consulted should be listed serially at the end of each article under the headline REFERENCES. Notes commenting or explaining points made in the text should appear after the main text, not at the bottom of the page. Each article should be accompanied by a separate (cover) sheet indicating the title of the paper as well as the following information about the author: (i) Full name; (ii) institutional affiliation; and (iii) current status. For the purpose of blind peer-reviewing, the first page of each article should not bear the name(s) of the author(s). The maximum acceptable number of authors and co-authors is three. The Managing editor expects precision in presentation. Prospective contributors should therefore avoid unnecessary flowery language; write in simple easy- to-comprehend style. All articles should be sent as e-mail attachment to: fakhra.aziz@lcwu.edu.pk

Subscription Rates

Single Copy	Individual	Institutional
Pakistan (Rs)	300 .00	250.00
Overseas (\$)	40.00	35.00

Contact

Editor

Journal of Arts and Social Sciences,
Department of Education
Lahore College for Women University,
Jail Road, Lahore.

Office: 92-042-99203801-05 Ext 272

Email: fakhra.aziz@lcwu.edu.pk

