

# Quarterly

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## From the Director's Desk

Who decides, who governs, and who rules are questions of crucial significance for policy analysts. Such questions make one ponder how legitimacy of a political order is evolved, contested and constructed. As Pakistan makes a transition to democratic order and party rule, suspicions and expectations are roused given the checkered history of the political process. Smooth, transparent and vigorously contested election for the office of the president on September 6th 2008 is a citizen morale booster. It enhances the legitimacy of electoral process and representative government but does not guarantee institutional balance, efficient decision making, citizen friendly public policies and their effective implementation. At the CPPG, our endeavor is to not only raise the level of awareness on policy issues but also to bridge the gap between awareness and possible action.

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Dr. Saeed Shafqat  
Raheem ul Haque



CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY  
AND GOVERNANCE

## An Interview with the Rector of FC College Dr. Peter Armacost



**: Dr. Peter Armacost,**

the Rector of FC College gave an extended interview to the CPPG on the 5th of August. He shared his vision, outlined his plan for college and university education at FC College, discussed challenges and problems associated with the process of denationalization, reflected on the HEC and its programs, revival of student unions and the need for policy relevant research.

### **CPPG: What inspired you to opt for Forman Christian College and Pakistan?**

I grew up in a family which considered life as an opportunity for service and to make society a better place. My father was a university president for 25 years and I grew up on a college campus. I heard the student point of view on the athletic fields and then also the administrative point of view at home and thus was well equipped to understand the problems in running an educational institution. My parents served as role models; they were deeply involved in the church and related national and international community activities but never at the expense of family life. Thus all my siblings have had an involvement in community service.

I had been a college and university president for 33 years, the last 23 years as president of Eckerd College, Florida. My life's mission had been higher education and working with young people in a church related setting. Our exposure to Pakistan and a relationship with the country started in 1988 when we became friends with a Pakistani couple—Ambassador Jamshed Marker and his wife. Through this friendship, we regularly met Pakistani dignitaries during their visits to Florida. Upon leaving Eckerd, I was approached by the Presbyterian Church (USA) to take up a challenging educational assignment in Pakistan, namely, recover and revive the FC College. The very thought of recovering and reviving an educational

institution brought together the sense of service; my mission in higher education and the prospect of international experience which had always been a part of my thinking.

### **CPPG: What were some of the major challenges that you faced while working for the de-nationalization of the college?**

Although the Presbyterian Church (USA) had been negotiating since 1994, the denationalization process had really started in the late nineties but the 1999 change of government delayed it. It started again after the formation of the political government in 2002. On my first trip to Pakistan in 2002, I realized that the government and alumni were favorably disposed to denationalize FC College. However, the Governor issued a denationalization notice for 60 colleges in July 2002, and the faculty members on those campuses formed the Joint Action Committee to organize protest demonstrations. As a result, the government appeared unwilling to move forward with denationalization. Over 2,000 faculty knew that with 60 fewer colleges to which to transfer them, they could not count on staying in Lahore. I made three trips over the course of a year and it became clear to me that to carry the process forward, I needed to actually move to Lahore ready to assume leadership immediately upon the denationalization of FCC. So we made the move. Our Board concluded that if the College was not denationalized, the alternative would be

to establish a new university, which looking back would have been an easier proposition.

As we worked on the modalities of taking over the College, I must share with you that the government was supportive all along and accomplished all required tasks except to get rid of illegal occupants who had taken a Stay Order from the Court. On two occasions the Court has ruled in our favor and some of the illegal occupants have been removed. However, that case regarding those still on campus is pending. The MOU with the Government required us to pay all faculty on the payroll for up to 6 months, interview all, those hired will stay on; while those who opposed denationalization and preferred government service would be transferred to other government colleges. The process was not easy and smooth, there were protests. Various faculty members met at 10 AM every morning, boycotted classes and along with mostly external help from Jamiat and some linked FC College students raised slogans outside the administrative block. One day following my invited lecture to a class, students from that class were forced to listen to the protest speeches for that day. However, it moved beyond peaceful protest when these elements entered a restricted examination area and tore up the statistics exam. The Controller Examinations, who as it turned out was against denationalization, was unwilling to stop them. I was appalled and could not approve this bad behavior, however, because of emotionally charged environment was advised to postpone the examination. When the College reopened after a couple of months, the atmosphere had stabilized as the faculty rehiring process was complete and teachers vehemently opposed to denationalization transferred to other colleges. Following denationalization we kept the intermediate (FA/ FSc) program intact, while the higher education program has been transformed into a four year baccalaureate. This has been harder than starting a new university program.

**CPPG: FC College is still going through a transformation from college to a university and in the eyes of many, you are perceived as someone who has 'rescued, revived and transformed' FC College? How did you go about it? Could you give us a sense of your vision and what steps are you taking to achieve this?**  
We were faced with a number of challenges as we went through the denationalization transition. The buildings required Rs.145 million to get them in working condi-

tion, a task we have yet to complete. The culture of lack of accountability was prevalent among the faculty as attendance was full on paper but few students took their classes, instead going to evening academies. To revive the College and become a functional university, our biggest challenge was finding good faculty and re-establishing a culture of accountability.

My vision is to make FC College, the best liberal arts college in South Asia. Our goal has been to start a strong four year liberal arts program, build on the existing physical infrastructure and hire quality faculty. Our initial faculty in 2003 included many persons with only the Pakistani Masters degree of 16 years of education with no experience in teaching higher order thinking skills in a liberal arts program setting. For accreditation purposes we must have faculty members with at least 18 hours of graduate credit beyond the 16th year of education. Thus we have aggressively sought new faculty members with M.Phil and PhD degrees for our four year baccalaureate program and simultaneously conducted faculty development workshops. After five years, we are now at the end of the curve in implementing our 4 year program. We had hired only 35 out of the 200 Government FCC faculty at the time of denationalization and have since hired a total of 208 faculty members while the student enrollment has gone up by 38%.

“ My vision is to make FC College, the best liberal arts college in South Asia. Our goal has been to start a strong four year liberal arts program, build on the existing physical infrastructure and hire quality faculty ... the faculty credentials are not the key issue so much as the quality of teaching, faculty willingness to be helpful to students and providing personalized education, and of being active in non-class room activities. ”

In my estimation faculty credentials are not the key issue so much as the quality of teaching, faculty willingness to be helpful to students and providing personalized education, and of being active in non-class room activities.

Our major challenge is to inculcate a spirit of continuing education among faculty members; so that they remain current and abreast of new academic developments in their disciplines. At this point in our history, I consider it more important than even conducting research.

In addition to our four year baccalaureate program, we are now concentrating on a small number of M.Phil and PhD programs. We plan to have them accredited in the West and thus want to maintain quality in both instruction and research.

Our faculty salaries were 20% higher than other institutions when we started our strategic planning process, but since HEC's public university Tenure Track System (TTS), faculty retention is bound to come under pressure. We seek to be in a position to offer salaries that are competitive with those of the TTS, and we are concentrating on making FC College's environment its main competitive advantage. In this, we have been partly successful as we've been able to attract faculty from different universities without much of a difference in the salary structure.

Eventually we plan to completely separate the college and university education; the budgets are already separate, the faculty may teach in both but we plan to make their decision making completely independent.

Fund raising is an important part of our strategy. A process is required to build a base of small donors - the challenge being to get a large number of donors to pay regularly over time and to cultivate major donors. After the missionaries left in 1973, we lost our church linked donor constituency in the US. Although we have raised \$2.8 million from private sources in the US in the last three years, it was primarily through personal contacts rather than through institutional mechanisms. We are thus fast building our institutional capacity and currently have a full time person working in the US specifically for this purpose.

Though Pakistanis are extremely generous, they usually donate to individual or religious causes rather than to institutions. Thus our biggest challenge on the domestic front has been to convince alumni and other donors to contribute collectively to institutions. When I first met the alumni, they were quite disillusioned with the college as

a result of nationalization. They desired denationalization but the leadership was restrained. Since then, an alumni leadership committed to working with the administration has emerged and alumni have been vigorous in helping us solicit donations from the business community. We started an annual fund in our first year and 37 people donated for scholarships. To improve, we created a 3 to 1 challenge, where three alumni would contribute Rs 1 million each provided that 300 other donors contributed 1.5 million collectively. We were successful in achieving it. We are currently in the middle of a three year Rs. 542 million fund raising campaign to refurbish older buildings (N-block & North Hall), construct a new Science building, a Campus Center in addition to funding scholarships and creating an endowment. We need a cash endowment of Rs. 50 million to get a 'W' status from the HEC as it does not accept our revenue generating land assets. This designation would make us eligible for scholarships as well as for 50% matching funds for buildings.

Our library resources are currently limited and we have modified our strategic planning to create a new library that can hold up to 300,000 volumes, can accommodate at least 25% of the student body and is wired to access electronic journals and to provide required student services. We need about Rs. 3 Billion for all of our construction projects, almost half of which has been accomplished but the rest will be much harder.

“ We need a cash endowment of Rs. 50 million to get a 'W' status from the HEC as it does not accept our revenue generating land assets. This designation would make us eligible for scholarships as well as for 50% matching funds for buildings. ”

**CPPG:** For about 100 years FC College saw a rise and expansion and became the leading educational institution of South Asia. How and when you think the decline set in? Could you identify some of the causes of decline?

The reason for the academic decline was not simply

government's control of the college but its failure to manage it properly. The quality of the faculty deteriorated as hiring criteria became political rather than academic and accountability vanished. The students unions became hyper active while college administration lacked the required decision making authority.

To improve quality of education, rote memorization has to give way to critical thinking and education has to include the length and breadth of various academic disciplines. The main reason we wanted to become a university was to be able to create our own curriculum and manage the examination system. In the new program we require students to take courses in all four areas - social sciences, humanities, natural sciences and mathematics. To ensure quality, each student has to pass a competency exam comprising of general subjects including Written English, Spoken English, Urdu, Quantitative Skills, and Computer Skills while before graduation each student has to pass a comprehension exam in their selected major. By training students on how to apply and integrate knowledge from various disciplines, their learning habits can be transformed. Therefore, I am of the view that until the examination system of FA/FSc is changed, one does not see much hope, as the only way to do well in these exams is through rote memorization. Some attempts are being made to provide an alternative examination system such as the Agha Khan University initiative; however, its outcome still remains a promise. Since our brightest FA/FSc students go into professional colleges after graduation, therefore, we have started A-levels to create a feeder program for our baccalaureate program, hoping for a change and better outcome.

**CPPG: You have been interacting with the HEC, in your view, what are some of the major challenges that University Education is confronted with in Pakistan?**

The task of the Higher Education Commission (HEC) is extremely difficult; it is always a challenge to improve quality and increase access simultaneously. HEC's goal to double enrollment in five and triple it in ten years requires a proportional increase in quality faculty members otherwise the quality of graduates will suffer. HEC has followed the correct strategy to invest in faculty development in the early stages including the scaling up of the USAid Fulbright program which is now the largest in the world. The concentration on the number of PhDs graduated in

Pakistan is a bit misplaced, I think, until more emphasis is placed upon the quality of these programs. I would also suggest that HEC select only a small number of public universities and invest heavily in the quality of those universities rather than attempting to lure foreign universities to come to Pakistan at huge expense to the government. I would also urge the HEC to work to strengthen the private not-for-profit universities as an integral part of the strategy to improve higher education.

**CPPG: How is FC College different from other private universities?**

What differentiates us from most private non-profit universities is that we are not a propriety body and thus have no concept of profit. We give scholarship support to 1600 – 1900 students every year and we also serve the minority community which is predominantly poor. I want to mention that for every Christian student, there are at least two Muslim students who get scholarship. Additionally what differentiates us from all private universities is the wide array of academic options we provide as most private universities concentrate only on financially lucrative academic disciplines. We are also different in that we provide a general education to prepare students for citizenship rather than focusing only upon career preparation. We plan to avoid discontinuity of pricing and would like to be able to charge tuition that allows us to pay good faculty salaries. A flat tuition fee can lead to loss of faculty and thus academic quality, on the other hand a huge raise in tuition leads to a loss of student enrollment. Our scholarship program is strategically linked to our tuition philosophy to avoid losing deserving qualified students. Our tuition is still a fraction of that charged by LUMS.

**CPPG: Has there been a conscious effort behind the regional diversity that one sees among the FC College student body and how do you manage the vastly different educational background of these students?**

The quality of the student body and thus student induction is critical for any university. We are self conscious of the diversity of our student body as it is an important aspect of the learning experience; the diversity is caused more by our reputation and history rather than aggressive recruitment. We aim to continue building on this diversity and be proactive to recruit nationally, after adding 1,100 hostel beds to the existing 550. Once this is accomplished,

we also plan to encourage international students through regular and exchange programs.

We do try to provide a "level playing field" for students with varied backgrounds but we still need to do a better job. For English teaching, we have a structured program which places students according to their competency level with an opportunity to take higher level courses after developing a better mastery of English. More important is the degree of personal attention given by the faculty in each class as most kids joining FC College are bright enough to make up the lag as long as some extra help is provided.

**CPPG: The new government has recently allowed restoration of the Student Unions. Do you have a suggestion on the model that can be followed?**

A Student Government with active student body involvement is good for a university as student representatives help the administration understand what students are thinking allowing them to make better decisions. Universities that greatly impact student values have four things in common:

- High expectations and a mission that is widely understood and shared.
- The role of faculty is broadly defined to include comparable activity outside the classroom as well as inside. Faculty members with the greatest impact on students are usually ones involved in student societies or interactive laboratory work.
- It provides meaningful opportunities to students, to make decisions that are important not just for students but also for the institution. Student government has been shown to be an important factor in this regard.
- It provides students opportunities to use their classroom acquired knowledge outside in a completely different setting leading to a value laden experience. This inculcates in students that what they learn in class really makes a difference in practical life.

But unfortunately the student union experience in Pakistan is complicated by political parties using students to

influence the management of the university. In the US, Young Republicans and Young Democrats aggressively try to involve students in local body, state and national politics but they have no involvement in student government and thus university administration. This clear demarcation between national issues based student politics and student government allows for a proper functioning of both.

I do think the Student Government idea can be implemented under a framework of our existing code of conduct as it covers most aspects such as destruction of property, but the key is to involve students so that they become stakeholders in the university and its betterment. Since student unions are still not operative at the FC College, I have met with the representatives of 29 student societies to get their feedback and to understand what they are thinking. The overlying issue for the administration is adequate student representation and not necessarily a student vote since it is not a democracy. A class based representation is hard to manage so societies currently seem the best option. Considering students are involved in mostly academic department linked societies, each with its own faculty advisor, their office holders can be constituted into a parliament to elect a student body leader.

**CPPG: Public Policy and Governance are not business ventures, what prompted you to envision and encourage the launch of such a program?**

Although the university directly transforms the lives of individuals, the context of the broader community has to be kept in mind. After being in Pakistan for a year with a better understanding of the ground realities, I thought that it was important to use the expertise of academia to make a difference in the life of the broader community. I had seen the impact of such a center at Eckerd College when I saw no existing example where practitioners and theoreticians came together to research and devise public policy. I have proposed the idea of an Academy of Senior Professionals, which fits well in this strategy as experienced practitioners can share their wealth of knowledge with academics and students to improve the overall academic experience and enrich research. This coming together of the various experts in their fields can auger well for Pakistan.

*Dr. Saeed Shafiqat  
interviewing  
Dr. Peter Armacost*





## Faculty Seminar Series

: **Dr. Salman Sayyid**,

Research Fellow at the Department of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds, UK was invited as a Distinguished Guest Speaker at the CPPG Faculty Seminar Series on June 11, 2008. He gave a talk on:

*Modernity, Post Modernity & Crises in the Muslim World: Prospects for Renewal and Renaissance.*

Discussants: **Dr. Wajid Ranjha**, Chairman, Department of Political Science, FC College, **Professor Saroosh Irfani**, Communications and Cultural Studies at the National College of Arts



Dr. Sayyid provided a wide ranging overview of the modernity, post modernity theoretical debate, analyzed the crises in the Muslim World in that context and then ventured to explore the prospects of renewal and renaissance in Muslim societies. He started by defining modernity as a concept that considers history to be progressive, considers rationality and science as arbiters of knowledge while relegating all non-scientific discourses to marginal explanatory power status. In affect modernity promotes universalism – considering the history of human civilization as exploration and expansion of the history of Europe and essentialism – accepting meta-narratives, a one big story to encompass the entire world. Post Modernity rather than a temporal consequence of Modernity is instead analyzed as somewhat parasitic – it considers concepts and categories as reflections of particular processes thus rejects equating European values with universal values or creating a hierarchy which puts the White Man on top of the ladder, an African pygmy at the bottom and all other people somewhere in the middle. It also rejects the permanent and fixed base analysis of essentialism.

Sayyid highlighted two events that defy the claims of modernity. First the Holocaust, which resulted in the killing of about 10 million people. He was emphatic in pointing out its shocking feature; it's dispassionate, controlled and systematic nature as well as the use of industrial means.

He argued that this use of industrial technology to change human beings into raw material (soap) rejected the notion of benignity of technology and scientific knowledge. A bigger shock was that it happened in Germany, the heart of Europe thus laying bare the claims of benign development of civilization. This was significant because a similar brutality outside of Europe could easily have been disregarded as part of the "uncivilized" – the un-modern. Second the Anti-imperialist struggles, which challenged the claims that Imperialism brought justice or a better life for most people. Earlier, resisters were dismissed as confronting pupils of imperialists but the Algerian and Vietnamese struggles saw millions die rather than accept the gifts of modernity. Thus the central claim of modernity that West represented the universal, was the best that the world had to offer, others should appropriate its lessons and become western and modern as quickly as possible was challenged. Sayyid calls it "Decentering of the West" as it de links western values, culture practices and formations from universal values and practices. Instead it accepts the West as just another cultural formation and argues that universal values can be generated from any cultural formation without going through westernization.

While calling for "Decentering of the West" Sayyid launched a frontal attack on Kemalism, terming it a form of modernity discourse that was still dominant across the

Muslim world. He argued that the reforms introduced by Kemal Attaturk including the 'Uncivilized Head Gear Act' – banning the fez and hijab and the 'Language Reforms' changing the script from Arabic to Latin were meant to modernize Turkey – as Kemalism equates modernity and civility to Westernization. In reality, however, Sayyid claimed, Kemalism has split Muslim societies into two parallel streams, one Oriental and the other Western. It further prescribes 'Westernization' for the 'Oriental' because Western is presented as rational and progressive while Oriental as irrational and reactionary. It thus creates markers based on perception rather than reality such as equating hijab with backwardness and repression without regard to whether hijab enhances the agency of women in particular societies. Critiquing Kemalism, Sayyid went on to suggest that Kemalism is centered on the idea of a nation, Westernization and a need for societies to de-orientalize themselves, which in Muslim societies is equated with de-Islamization or restriction of the role of Islam in public affairs. Secularism, Sayyid argued was specific to European history as 100 years of religious wars led them to limit religious discourse in public sphere to achieve civic peace. But it could not be termed universal as most secular regimes in the Muslim world had also been the most brutal. Without discussing, elaborating or judging the various practical projections of Islamism (Muslim Brotherhood, Taliban and Al-Qaeda), he presented it as a cultural, intellectual and political movement responding to Kemalism. He went on to observe that till the abolition of the Caliphate, the Muslim political thought restricted itself to finding the best candidate for a ruler—focusing on the qualities of a caliph while the system of governance was taken for granted. It was only after the abolition of the caliphate that the question of political authority became meaningful for the Muslim political discourse with the quest for an Islamic order. Question arose if Muslims required a particular political arrangement to be Muslims or whether an Islamic government or state was unnecessary?

Sayyid considered the Pakistan Movement as the first challenge to Kemalism articulating Muslims to constitute a political community requiring a state. It was the Khilafat Movement that initially mobilized the Muslim masses but the template followed to institutionalize the Pakistan Movement was instead Kemalist. He asserted that

although incorporating Islam as an ideology in a modern constitution was pioneered here, still the dilemma continues as governing practices of Pakistani state remain Kemalist while its mobilization practices have been Islamist. The public debate still takes the idiom of Islam but actual interventions are unable to imagine what an Islamic government would be like? He thought a more concrete challenge to the Kemalist narrative came from the Iranian Revolution. Most importantly with Khomeini's *Vilayat-e Faqih* which Sayyid claimed has bridged the intellectual difference between Shia and Sunni political thought by also requiring the Shia to live under an Islamic government till the advent of the 12th imam. He articulated that although Khomeini wanted to allow all Muslims to be able to become rulers of Iran, it was the Kemalist institutional baggage that restricted him to limit Iran's leadership only to Iranians.

“ It is Islamism's antagonism to Kemalism that has defined the various conflicts in the Muslim world. For Islamists', Islam has to be at the center of any sociopolitical order. ”

Summing up the various strands of his presentation he conclusively stated that it is Islamism's antagonism to Kemalism that has defined the various conflicts in the Muslim world. For Islamists', Islam has to be at the center of any sociopolitical order. But rather than debating what kind of Islam at an empirical level (praying five times, fasting & others), Sayyid argued that centering Islam should instead concentrate on Muslims defining their own historical sequence which begins at the moment of revelation and continues till today. The affect of colonialism has been to cut this sequence leaving the colonized with no history, no memory and thus no personality. It has made Muslims vulnerable as they have no biography which can be tied to a larger historical sequence other than the Western 'Plato to NATO' sequence.

Thus the real challenge for Muslims as well as other nations of the world is to try to recover and rearticulate a historical sequence which has its own intrinsic value.



This demands "Decentering the West"-- displacement of the idea that there is one universal history patented on the West and therefore an understanding that there are multiple historical sequences. The framing of the current world's foundation is only 200-300 years old and is based on binary opposition and violent hierarchy of the West and the Non-West. Sayyid sees Islam as breaking through this framing to have its own category, its own integrity rather than being an opposition to the West.

“The real challenge for Muslims as well as other nations of the world is to try to recover and rearticulate a historical sequence which has its own intrinsic value. This demands "Decentering the West"-- displacement of the idea that there is one universal history patented on the West and therefore an understanding that there are multiple historical sequences. ”

Commenting on Sayyid's presentation, Dr. Wajid Ranjha chose to focus on the theoretical dimension. He defined modernity as a process of rationalization, of looking at the world as a process oriented and rational way rather than attributing miraculous or mysterious causes to it. He was vigorous in spotlighting the Nietzschean term 'The death of God' as the defining moment for modernity as man becomes God, leading to a secularizing and a constructivist project which in addition individualizes structures at the expense of group identity. For Ranjha, postmodernism is not an anti-thesis of modernity. While it critiques modernity and its grand narratives, it still carries a pre-supposition of the cultural horizon of the West and does not provide an option to exit modernity. It is still a secularizing project which in ways refines the modernity venture. For him the crucial moment for post modernity is Heidegger saying that there is nothing to celebrate about the death of God as it only leaves behind value relativism, skepticism and the uncertainty that goes into constructing new paradigms to orient one self in place of grand narratives.

Dr. Ranjha explored the history of Orientalism and highlighted the theory of Aryans invading India to create the great Indo-Aryan civilization. Thus while negating the genesis of an indigenous Indian civilization, Orientalists created an essentialist Indo-European identity which excluded Muslims as outsiders belonging to the Middle East. They were neither Indian nor European and thus not part of the Indian Vedic civilization. He further argued that Pakistan had inherited this contested identity and this contestation continues to persist.

Professor Saroosh Irfani had a more sympathetic view of modernity from the point of view of human interiority as encompassed in the psychoanalytical school. He considered the publication of Freud's Interpretation of Dreams and the three year solitary world voyage of Joshua Slocum as the founding moments of modernity for the contemporary individual. Irfani expressed that these events brought in the open both the dimensions of human interiority that were on the margins as well as explored its relationship with the external (human and nature). By making individual the focus, Irfani observed, a new relationship was created among individuals and between the individual and the external. He defined modernity as an individual's reflective relationship to the present. Within Islamic discourse he considered Iqbal's concept of finality of the prophet as revolutionary as it left the individual to his own resources rather than being enthralled to an outside spiritual authority. Thus giving authority to the individual as in the Nietzschean moment, but still including God.

Acknowledging Sayyid's argument, Irfani observed that the main challenge was to recover Muslim memory following the historical rupture of colonialism which had led to transplanted forms of modernity through the Kemalist and Pahlevi experiment. Professor Irfani drew attention that both Iqbal and Ali Shariati worked on the very idea of recovering Muslim memory. He pointed out that what differentiated Shariati from Iqbal and Iran from Pakistan was that in Iran of the 1970s, modernity and its interpretive approach became generalized. Individuals themselves became interpreters of original texts of history, religion, Marxism and other forms of knowledge. What differentiated the Iranian Revolution even from the Chinese and Russian counterparts was the scale of mobilization of the urban masses and the intellectual involvement of

the younger generation. He thus argued that modernity, a reflective relationship to the present that presents itself as a task, was critical in creating a groundswell of intellectual energy. That showed the way to recovering the Muslim memory and articulating own historical sequence.

For Irfani, Post Modernity was an extension of the psycho analytical experience which brought suppressed inner processes into the mainstream and highlighted the marginalized dimensions of human experience. He argued that even with a general overemphasis on secularism, Depth Psychology had referenced eastern mysticism in its exploration of the collective unconscious and thus accepted the possibility of immortality of the individual self – what Iqbal called 'Khudi'. He thus disagreed with defining boundaries in the current intellectual discourse of hyper secularism on the one side and deep mysticism on the other, instead cherishing it for its diversity.

Although agreeing with Sayyid regarding the implications of Vialayat-e-Faqih and of Khomeini's role as a visionary, Irfani added that Khomeini still carried the sectarian baggage which led to the prolonging of the Iran – Iraq war as it changed from a defensive war into a war for liberation of Karbala and Jerusalem. Unfortunately a critical debate has yet to begin on the Iran – Iraq war as it is considered sacrosanct in Iran. Irfani argued that modern consciousness requires a deep engagement with both the brutality of the Holocaust and the Iran – Iraq war thus arguing for a secular historical project.

Initial presentation and comments by the discussants were followed by a Question and Answer session. In response to a question of why Holocaust was central to modern consciousness even for the Non-Europeans, Sayyid said that before the Holocaust, all inhumane practices later applied in Europe were

common place in the colonies but the division of space helped cover the double face. Though the brutality of imperialism was unsurpassed, Holocaust which was imperialism brought home highlighted the structural hypocrisy of Western modernity. Irfani added that Holocaust denial was limited to small politicized segments of Muslim societies that benefited from an atmosphere of confrontation with the West.

Answering another question "What, where and if there is a universal Muslim memory?" Sayyid said that every country that has come into being has created its own national history. It's the subject that determines the history rather than the other way round, so building a consensus on a subject is a pre-requisite to defining a historical sequence. If Muslim is the subject, then the history begins at the founding moment of what can be categorized a Muslim, more importantly it would be the beginning of Islam as a social political order. An identity inclusive of Indus Valley and Gandharan civilizations would instead require a different subject than that of a Muslim. Thus, though accepting the prerogative of the people to choose their own subject, Sayyid could not relate to the thesis of Indian Islamic civilization with its diversity of historical sequences.

Regarding the question "How can you have an alternative without articulating an epistemic (system of knowledge) alternative?" Sayyid answered that an epistemic revolution itself required a foundation which was only possible through a political project that realigns values. But an epistemic revolution first requires "Decentering the West". Thus the language of 'Clash of Civilizations was ludicrous as currently only Western civilization existed and all others were just a subset of it'.



*Participants at the seminar*

Islamic Philosophical Association of Pakistan was established in 1982. Its members comprise of business, industry, banking, education, law, medicine, bureaucracy and judiciary. A relatively small professional organization, once a month it invites an expert, scholar or policy maker to share respective views/research with its members.

: **Dr. Saeed Shafqat**, Director, Centre for Public Policy and Governance delivered a talk on *Social and Political Transformation of Pakistani Political Elites* at the Gymkhana Club on the 4th of June, 2008



Dr. Shafqat started the talk by making a basic point that the political parties have to become institutions of public representation and sustain a representative form of government, if they aim to dislodge and disengage the military from Pakistani politics. He articulated that theoretical literature can be summarized in four basic approaches that explain the flourishing of democracy in a society. First, that democracy is a function of level of economic development; the higher the level of economic development, the better is the prospect of flourishing of the democracy. Economic development leads to a vibrant middle class whose interest is in sustaining free market economy, protecting rights and freedoms and building democracy. Second, that democracy is a function of level of education; the higher the education levels of a society, the greater are the chances of having a democracy. Third, that democracy is a function of cultural pluralism and work ethics; that a correlation exists between the culture of a society and its chances to create a representative form of government – a Weberian hypothesis arguing that the rise of democracy in Western Europe was directly linked to the Protestant ethic. He postulated that it is the fourth approach; that democracy is a function of elites' ability to bargain, comprise and build consensus on normative aspects of democracy – rule of law, respecting dissent, protecting minority rights, and mainstreaming gender that could be most helpful in explaining the Pakistani case.

To pursue this logic, Shafqat started with the premise that the masses and the general public may be able to help in sustaining democracy but constructing democracy is a function of the elites. It is thus important to study the evolution and transformation of Pakistani elites to opine

on the prospects of democracy in Pakistan. He propounded that in the last 37 years the structure of Pakistani elites has undergone social and political transformation and at least five trends are visible. In particular he looked at the military, civil bureaucracy, political parties and the religious elites. Among these elite structures, the role of military is peculiarly different because it has been involved in the construction of other elites. If history is an indicator, each military regime in Pakistan has indulged in patronizing a new set of individuals to construct political elites who would adopt the political system projected by the military.

Closely looking at the institutional make up of Pakistan's military, in particular since 1979, an enormous change in social origins can be observed. Generals Jehangir Karamat and Pervez Musharaf and their cohorts were the last breed of pre-independence born military elites. 2007 has been an unprecedented year; it marks the ascendancy of an indigenous Pakistani, born after independence at the helm of military decision making. Until 1971 the base of military elites (Brigadier to General) was relatively small totaling around 120 officers. Today there is a five fold increase – the base of military elites has considerably expanded to over 600. However, the strategic decision making is confined to 10 Corps Commanders and another 30–40 top staff officers. Their ethnic, social class and educational composition has also become noticeably dif-fused. There is considerable speculation on the ideological orientation of military elites. During the 1960s and until mid 70s, the generals from rural background and the Pothwar—the so called 'martial races' were dominant; the new breed is much more urban and has a humbler social

origin. Shafqat argued that Pakistani military has moved beyond the soldierly profession and assumed constabulary functions. In the post 1979 period, with the exception of Kargil conflict (1999), the military has increasingly been involved in combating internal disorder, fighting internal insurgency and planning counter-insurgency. Further it has performed U.N. and policing functions and managed industrial, business, commercial and real estate ventures. Thus, the first noticeable trend is that military has become a corporate entity, its role and relationship in Pakistani society has undergone transformation—it has acquired a new sense of confidence that hinders it to accept the supremacy of civilian leadership.

The second visible trend is the changing composition, orientation and educational background of the emerging bureaucracy. The Pakistan civil bureaucracy which is the pivotal pillar of governance and till late 1980's was the backbone of administration; is now, plagued with crisis of moral authority and institutional decline. Unlike the 1950s, 1960s to early 1970s, it no longer attracts the brightest, who instead opt for business schools and IT. Since the mid 1990's the recruitment pool has changed from upper to middle and lower middle social classes who for status enhancement and limited choices of personal advancement still find competitive examination as the only vehicle for social climbing. He argued that in public perception and also in reality, the integrity of the Federal Public Services Commission (FPSC) has eroded considerably. Since 2001 Police is the most preferred occupation group. The yearly reports of the FPSC pointing to the choice of service indicate that the change in composition is not conducive for promoting representative government but appears more supportive for authoritarianism and clientelism.

The third visible trend is that the political elites leading the political parties are becoming more dynastic and their leaders unabashed in giving key party positions to family members. Political Parties are in decay, organizationally weak, lacking vision, without ideological commitment and have no leadership succession plan. The current ruling coalition has banded together not on the basis of any principle but on simple Machiavellian notions of power. Thus the outcome has been a cosmetic change in the procedural dimension of democracy because they have

acquired a degree of legitimacy through elections. But the normative dimension of democracy – respect for rule of law, dissent and core values of tolerance, accommodation, bargain and consensus is still missing. Shafqat raised the question of how political parties, who do not have a democratic culture, who pursue power without regard to public good, whose leaders are disconnected from ordinary workers and who still need an outside 'international broker' to communicate among each other can provide an alternative to the military?

The fourth visible trend is a significant change among religious institutions and religious leadership. Last thirty years have seen a rise of Madaris as a primary source of social status and political power. It is significant that these Madaris have produced a new breed of the religious elite that claims religious scholarship as well as leadership of their own political parties. They have increasingly become assertive and uncompromising in projecting and introducing their own form of Sharia. Since the late 1970's state patronage, Afghan Jihad (read U.S and Saudi Arabia) and trading communities have been at the forefront in supporting these new religious elites. This has greatly influenced the Pakistani political discourse as religiosity rather than religious principles and ethics has made strong inroads leading to constraints on the social, cultural, political and economic activities. Shafqat argued that the critical question is to what degree this religiosity has produced the jihadi culture? He observed that there is considerable evidence to argue that without state connivance and support, neither religious elites could flourish nor militancy would have become the monster it has become. In any case, the main casualty has been the liberal political space which has shrunk as a consequence.

But the transformation of greatest significance is the structural presence of the US in Pakistan's policy and strategic decision making because of overexposure, connivance and collaboration of the Pakistani elites—military, bureaucratic, political, religious and business; resultantly, it has become hard to differentiate between the interests of the US policy makers and these domestic elites. According to newspaper reports, he said it is worth pondering that out of the 240 plus members of the 2002 national assembly, 35 members had US nationality. During the 1950s the military elites set the ball rolling with the

provision of air space, later extending to logistical support and then intelligence gathering post 2001. Now almost all aspects of internal law & order, regional relations, centre piecing terrorism, money laundering, nuclear proliferation and most ministries (to name a few, Interior, Defense, Commerce and Finance) have a bilateral arrangement with the US. The commander of CENTCOM, (US Central Command overseeing the Middle East, Persian Gulf, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia comprising of 27 countries) makes regular trips to Pakistan. What is important to realize is that the Pakistani state is hard put to make a case for sovereignty as sovereignty is but 'organized hypocrisy' in its case. Pakistan's governance issues are no longer internal as outside help and support has become imperative in governing the country. This is the paradox that while power elites collaborate, connive and compromise in consolidating this structural presence, it breeds emotional outbursts and antagonism on the street. There is thus a growing disconnect between the power elites and the civil society.

“ The Pakistani state is under duress ... The critical challenge is whether the Pakistani state will be able to acquire a legitimate basis of authority through institutions or a credible political leader, or will it continue to be seen without legitimacy. ”

As a consequence of change in the social and political composition and the orientation of the Pakistani elites, Shafqat conclusively claimed that the very structure—'institutional landscape' of the Pakistani state has undergone change. While the primary function of the state is monopoly of legitimate coercion; there are various areas of Pakistan where writ of state either does not exist or is being nibbled and eroded. To assert and resurrect itself, the state instead negotiates, mediates and uses force sometimes successfully and others not. The Pakistani state is under duress and battling with the idea of how to accommodate competing interests not confined to any one area or group. The critical challenge is whether the Pakistani state will be able to acquire a legitimate basis

of authority through institutions or a credible political leader, or will it continue to be seen without legitimacy. Shafqat considers the answer to this question and the nature of the elites to decide whether the interests of the lawyers' protests and political parties converge and whether the state would be able to dismantle and disrupt the terrorist networks. Would these elites be able to negotiate sustainable peaceful settlement with the Pakistani Taliban—at what cost and against which political and social freedoms?

Responding during the question-answer session; when asked whether a feudalistic society is conducive to democracy? Shafqat argued that though feudalism exists but it is not simply a class issue; it's the feudalistic state of mind that is the bigger problem as it promotes autocracy by creating a hierarchical relationship in every institution. For much a mind set, respecting individual rights would mean that certain amount of power must be conceded. The constellation of Pakistani elites is crumbling but is still resistant to learn and make that change.

Answering another question if ideology plays a part in elite institutions and if the ideology of Pakistan's Military has changed? Shafqat replied that the motto of Pakistan military changed from Unity, Faith and Discipline to Imaan, Taqwa and Jihad during Zia-ul-Haq's time. Zia injected Islamic ideology in all institutions of the state and transformed the role of the military from defending the territorial boundaries of Pakistan to protecting the boundless and imaginary 'Ideological frontiers' of Pakistan.

Asked about his opinion on the lawyers' movement and transformation of civil society, Shafqat observed that he had yet to see the lawyers' protest as a movement because it had neither caught the imagination of nor penetrated the masses—it remains an urban phenomenon. However, he was emphatic in pointing out that this was the first time urban professionals belonging to the relatively prosperous sections of society including doctors, lawyers, teachers and mostly private university students agitated against the state. That was a very positive and encouraging development and could auger well for flourishing of the democratic process, but any change begged the question, if the lawyers' protest can transform itself into a people's movement?

: **Aneel Salman**, Associate Research Fellow at CPPG and a Fulbright Scholar pursuing PhD in Ecological Economics at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) presented this summary paper *New Directions in Development Economics and Climate Change* before a selected faculty at the CPPG on April 28, 2008

Two of the most pressing issues of our time are global climate change and the increasing income gap between the rich and the poor. Both of these issues are particularly acute in Pakistan with its unique and fragile environment and its rich and varied cultural and economic traditions. Dealing with these problems requires innovative approaches based on sound economic analysis and a detailed knowledge of the specific environmental and social conditions at work on the ground.

According to many observers, the micro foundations approach to economic theory has been in a state of crisis for some time now due to theoretical intractabilities within the Walrasian framework and empirical falsification of some of its basic assumptions regarding consumer and firm behavior<sup>1</sup>. (for surveys see Bowles and Gintis, 2000; Gowdy and Mayumi, 2001; Gowdy, 2004; O'Hara and Stiglitz, 2002). The importance of the debate within economics was highlighted in the Presidential Address to the 2007 American Economic Association in Chicago given by Nobel laureate George Akerlof who lamented the lack of correspondence between predictions made by macroeconomic models based on the "rational actor" model and actual human behavior: *"If there is a difference between real behavior and behavior derived from abstract preferences, New Classical economics has no way to pick up those preferences."*<sup>2</sup> He called for a redirection of economics based on norms of observed human behavior and the detailed workings of actual markets. Akerlof's advice is relevant to the quest to achieve a workable economic program to deal with economic development in the face of global climate change. Related development issues are gender inequality and the growing gap between the rich and the poor.

### New Directions in Development Economics

In addition to the changing realities of economic development, the issue of global climate change has also forced economists to re-think basic assumptions embedded in the traditional economic framework. For example,

Dasgupta writes: *"Climate change and biodiversity losses are two phenomena that are probably not amenable to formal, quantitative economic analysis. We economists should not have pressed for what I believe is misplaced concreteness."*<sup>3</sup> Likewise, Weitzman in a commentary on the Stern Review writes: *"But in lumping together objective and subjective uncertainties and thereby obscuring their distinction...I think that contemporary macroeconomics goes too far and leads to a mindset that too easily identifies probability (and "economic science") with exercise in calibration to sample frequencies from past data."*<sup>4</sup> Although he does not use the term, Weitzman calls for applying the "precautionary principle" to avoid the potentially catastrophic effects of global climate change. This change of attitude among economists who have written extensively about climate has important policy implications. And, although directed towards climate change models, the remarks of Dasgupta and Weitzman could easily be applied to many formal models of economic development.

### Economic Models of Climate Change

The most widely used economic models of climate change are integrated assessment models linking climate and economic simulations<sup>5</sup> (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996; Stern, 2007). These models start with the standard economic assumptions of rational actors, perfect competition, and optimizing behavior. We do not intend to go into a detailed critique of these optimizing-based climate change models (for this see Laitner, DeCanio, and Peters, 2001; Spash, 2002; van den Bergh, 2004)<sup>6</sup>. The debate concerning the Stern review has uncovered the fact that the differences among the major climate change models are driven almost solely by assumptions about the rate of discounting the benefits of climate change mitigation (avoiding the costs of future climate damage to economic activity) and costs of mitigation efforts.<sup>7</sup> The standard formula used in these models is based on the work of Ramsey (1928), Arrow (1966) and Fellner (1967)<sup>8</sup>, among others:

$$(1) \quad r = \Delta + \eta * g$$

Where  $r$  is the discount rate,  $\Delta$  is the rate of pure time preference,  $\eta$  is the elasticity of substitution for consumption, and  $g$  is the growth rate of per capita consumption. The "inherent discount rate"  $\Delta$  is the part of the discount rate arising solely from myopia or impatience (Spash,



2007)<sup>9</sup>.  $\eta$  reflects the extent to which marginal utility changes as income changes in the future. As the many critics of the Stern report have pointed out, the results of the report's modeling exercises are driven by (ultimately) arbitrary assumptions about the components of the discounting equation (1)—the rate of time preference, the marginal elasticity of consumption, and estimates of future consumption growth rates. There is no consensus on how to assign values to any of these numbers. In the case of climate change, we are dealing with pure uncertainty in terms of the potential risks, the prospects for future economic growth, and the "proper" social discount rate (Weitzman, 2007). As a result of the debate about economic modeling in the Stern report, the bad news is that there is consensus among economists that the standard economic model is of limited use in dealing with either mitigation or adaptation policy responses to climate change. But the good news is that the door is open for a realistic approach to deal with climate change that combines sound science and contemporary approaches to economic theory and policy. A positive outcome of the Stern Review debate is that it forced economists to recognize the ethical content of seemingly "positive" economic analysis. Another positive outcome of the climate change debate is the realization that the policy recommendations of climate change specialists echo the recommendations of development economists<sup>10</sup> (Kramer, 2007). In terms of social risk management, climate change adaptation policies represent "no regret" policies in the sense that they are desirable with or without climate change<sup>11</sup> (Heltberg et al, 2008).


### Climate Change in Pakistan

A consensus has emerged among scientists and policy makers that global climate change represents a major threat to the environment and to the well-being of humankind and the biosphere<sup>12</sup> (Stern, 2007; IPCC, 2007). During the past century, average global temperature has risen by about 1°C with much of that increase due to human activity, especially fossil fuel burning and deforestation. The rate of increase has accelerated during the past 20 years or so as the human impact now dominates natural processes. Global temperatures are projected to increase further by 1.4 °C to 5.8 °C by 2100 and to continue to rise long after that (IPCC, 2007). Scenarios of the likely consequences of such an increase differ substan-

tially among regions but include sea level rise, shortages of fresh water, increased droughts and floods, more frequent and intense forest fires, more intense storms, more extreme heat episodes, agricultural disruption, the spread of infectious diseases, and biodiversity loss.

South Asia is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. A substantial portion of the world's population lives in the four countries of Pakistan, Nepal, India and Bangladesh. Millions of people in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh will eventually be displaced by rising sea levels. The drinking water for much of India and Pakistan comes from the Himalayan, Karakoram, and HinduKush glaciers that are melting rapidly from warmer temperatures<sup>13</sup> (Jianchu et al., 2007). South Asian economies are heavily dependent on agriculture – the economic sector most vulnerable to climate change. Crop yields are already declining in the region, probably due to climate change. Also changes in the timing of monsoons are having an adverse effect.

The impact of climate change on Pakistan is likely to be severe. Climate change and environmental disruption, and the social disruption that is likely to accompany it, will probably have a negative impact on human development indicators. Sixty-five percent of Pakistan's population, and two-thirds of its poor, live in rural areas. These are the areas that will be most affected by climate change and will also be the most difficult to assess, plan for, and administer. Agricultural employment and income will likely be disrupted. Those with inadequate incomes



“ Climate change adaptation will depend critically on cooperation among countries, regions and individuals. Policies building on types of behavior conducive to cooperation, placing less emphasis on material possessions, and recognizing the necessity of shared sacrifice, are more likely to be successful in meeting the climate change challenge. ”

will be most vulnerable to sea level rise, water shortages, and the intensification of storms. In the decades to come much of the coastal areas of Pakistan will be submerged, water shortages will result from disappearing glaciers, and agricultural production will almost certainly be disrupted. These changes could lead to political instability, security concerns, and conflicts with neighboring countries. There is already a growing gap between rich and poor in Pakistan and climate change is likely to make this gap larger unless pre-emptive steps are taken. But how does a developing country like Pakistan cope with anticipated changes that are generally known but only vaguely understood in terms of timing and severity? One way to begin is to consider the basic human needs of the local people, and how the provision of these basic needs will be affected by climate change.

### Innovative Approaches to Climate Change and Development Policies

The effects of climate change will be felt first and foremost at the household level. In Pakistan, meeting this challenge will require a variety of policy approaches including technological innovations, empowering local communities with the tools and information they need to adapt, and setting up mechanisms to provide relief from the effects of climate change. Adapting to climate change is increasingly challenging and will become more and more difficult as global temperatures rise. The task will be made easier because of new directions in economic theory and policy recommendations recognizing the heterogeneity of regional economies and of human communities. Two new directions in economics are relevant to this task.

### Sustainable Well-Being

Traditional economic theory and development policy equates human welfare with per capita income <sup>14</sup> (Gowdy and Salman 2008). Frey and Stutzer (2002) point out that

economic text do not even discuss the meaning of human welfare but merely assume that welfare is equivalent to income and that higher income makes a person happier. <sup>15</sup> In contrast to the traditional approach, a growing body of economic research uses measures of subjective well-being as indicators of social welfare <sup>16</sup> (Kahneman and Sugden, 2005). These measures show that per capita income growth and increases in well-being is frequently only weakly correlated in real-world contexts, at least above some minimal income level (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). Focusing only on income misses some equally important contributors to well-being. John Holdren (2008) in his 2007 presidential address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science outlined the three pillars of sustainable well-being (1) economic conditions and processes, (2) sociopolitical conditions and processes, and (3) environmental conditions and processes. <sup>17</sup>

### Behavioral Economics

Another focus of contemporary economics beginning to influence public policy is what is variously called experimental economics, behavioral economics and evolutionary game theory. Experimental results from these related areas have firmly established that human choice is a social, not self-regarding, phenomenon. Two broad principles have emerged from the literature (1) human decision-making cannot be accurately predicted without reference to social context and (2) regular patterns of human behavior, including responses to rewards and punishments, can be predicted both within particular cultures and across cultures <sup>18</sup> (Gowdy, 2008). Among the identified regularities in human behavior and their policy implications are (1) the presence of altruism and cooperation in human societies, (2) altruistic punishment to eliminate free riding, promotion of cooperation, (3) the contribution of the natural environment to human well being, and (4) loss aversion and regret avoidance, among others. These

regularities are beginning to be successfully applied to policy design<sup>19</sup> (Duflo et al. 2005).

## Conclusion

Climate change adaptation will depend critically on cooperation among countries regions and individuals. Behavioral science has shown that competition and material accumulation are only one part of the richness of human behavioral patterns. Policies building on types of behavior conducive to cooperation, placing less emphasis on material possessions, and recognizing the necessity of shared

sacrifice, are more likely to be successful in meeting the climate change challenge. It is this evolutionary heritage that holds promise for more humane development policies and for meeting the unprecedented challenges humankind will face in the coming decades.

\* Author's Note: This is a short summary of a paper presented by Dr. John Gowdy, Professor Humanities and Social Science, Rensselaer University and President of International Ecological Economics, at the PIDE Conference, March 12-14, 2008, in Islamabad

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## Review Article


### Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia: Where is the Epicenter of Chaos?

Saeed Shafqat

In the last decade, evidence based, insightful, informative and yet disturbingly grim reportages have appeared centering on Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. The central theme of these writings has been that the brewing chaos that is spreading like wildfire is an outcome of the failure of international and national policies on terrorism and religious extremism. Ahmed Rashid's *Descent into Chaos: How the War against Islamic Terrorism is being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia* (London/New York: Allen Lane/Penguin Books, 2008) pp 484 is the latest addition on this topic. He is vociferous and meticulous in putting the onus on the US and Pakistani decision makers, regional rivalries and interventions, particularly the Intelligence Agencies (CIA-ISI) who through unscrupulous expediency, intrigue, professional skills and sophisticated networking have ignited this chaos. Drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, religious extremism, and deliberate perpetuation of warlords was pursued and promoted and even nuclear proliferation was

tolerated, as policy choices and goals. Ample reputable studies support the argument that lawlessness, religious extremism and perceptual 'clash of civilization' are man made—an outcome of flawed public policies and jaundiced leadership decisions: Ahmed Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism* (London & New Jersey: Zed Books, 1994) John Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism* (London: Pluto Press, 1999) Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm* (New Have/London: Yale University Press, 2002) Marry Ann Weaver, *Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002) Jean-Charles Brisard & Guillaume Dasquie, *Forbidden Truth: US-Taliban Secret Oil Diplomacy and Failed Hunt for Bin Laden* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2002) Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret Story of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004) provide abundant evidence and incisive portrayals of individual decision makers, their relationship with intelligence agencies and how the war on terror is planned and executed; first by promoting 'Global Jihad' and then by discrediting and thereby devising policies and developing strategies to uproot the same Jihadis, who were once allies but now became declared enemies and symbols of 'evil'.

These studies also make it clear that espionage, intelligence, counter-intelligence and implementation of state policy outside of the public purview are some basic realities on which Intelligence agencies thrive and become vital for the state. More importantly, these studies give chilling accounts of duplicity of State behavior and expose the growing gap between what strategic decision makers profess (promoting democracy and nation building) and what they practice (perpetuating warlords and drug trafficking)? But none comes close to Ahmed Rashid in de-



Ahmed Rashid

*Descent into Chaos: How the War against Islamic Terrorism is being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia*

Allen Lane / Penguin Books, London / New York, 2008

picting these players, weaving their relationships with one another and the intelligence agencies or providing graphic details of their wheeling dealings. His seminal paper, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism" in the prestigious [Foreign Affairs](#) Vol. 78, No 6, November/December 1999, in which he first forewarned about the emergence of extremism went virtually unnoticed among the international policy community. Among these reporters Ahmed Rashid retains the distinction of being persistent, vocal and vigorous in warning about the rising menace of Islamic militancy and its nexus with Intelligence agencies. He continues to be the most knowledgeable, astute and enthusiastic reporter of the societal transformations, undercurrents and elite manipulations, intrigues and the competing agendas and pursuits of intelligence agencies from Uzbekistan to Pakistan. As with his two earlier works, in which he provided wealth of information on individual decision makers, key actors, levels of institutional collaboration between US and Pakistan defense establishments and intelligence agencies, [Descent into Chaos](#) also provides an incisive analysis of how the new 'great game' is designed and who are the key players. The underlying premise and thrust of Ahmed Rashid's argument is that faulty vision, expediency, lack of historical and cultural understanding of the 'region', ascendancy of the neo-conservatives in Bush administration and larger than life role of CIA and ISI – their collaboration, connivance and treacherous collusion on crucial occasions and concurrently deep and growing distrust of each other is pushing the 'region' into chaos; disrupting social peace and political harmony. The book offers trenchant insight on how US 'ideals' are counterpoised to US 'national interest' and it's the national interest that reigns supreme. The two are oxymoron, declares Ahmed Rashid. He is particularly instructive in illustrating the preferences, motivations and goals of key players of the Bush administration in launching an attack on Afghanistan. How they built a 'coalition of the willing' to dislodge the Taliban? How the UN brought together a few experts in a small think tank group to construct the 2002 Bonn accord? How and why it faltered? The book is voluminous and contains wealth of information and analysis; conceptual and theoretical rigor is not its forte. An average reader may find the information load distracting and burdensome, however, for those who want to comprehend decision making and the role that Intelligence agencies play in the formulation of policy process

at the highest level, the book is enlightening on seven major themes. First, providing an insight into the mind set of key players of Bush administration – Rumsfeld, Cheney, Powell and the Neo-conservative cabal, Wolfowitz and the rest – their motives, preferences and goals. Rashid is incisive in detailing how Neo-cons thrived by creating a psychosis of fear through accentuating threats to American security, imaginary and real. Resultantly Americans are terrified and anxious about impending attack and war. The same cabal was instrumental in America's hasty plunge into Iraq, distracting stabilizing efforts, allowing Afghanistan and the region to slide into chaos as drug barons and warlords gained influence. Rashid calls Hamid Karzai, the president of Afghanistan a 'friend' and a 'man with a mission'; and like a good friend attempts to construct a sympathetic image of Karzai as an independent, self confident and committed Afghan leader. And yet each time Karzai finds himself in trouble it's the US Intelligence agencies, which are seen as rescuing him from difficult situations. Karzai leadership becomes more enticing as Rashid weaves Indo-Pakistan rivalry into the changing complexion of American involvement in Afghanistan. Rashid explains how after Taliban defeat, India took advantage to establish itself in Afghanistan "*India supported Karzai, established a lavish diplomatic presence in Kabul, funded aid programs, and according to Pakistan intelligence, sent Indian agents to train Baloch and Sindhi dissidents in Pakistan. Kabul had suddenly become the new Kashmir – the new battleground for India – Pakistan rivalry. The Americans obsessed with the hunt for Bin Laden, could not understand the larger strategic picture that was changing in front of their eyes.*" P 110. Despite Rashid's best intentions, Karzai's independence and autonomy does not hold ground; he remains a 'fiddle' at the mercy of US intelligence agencies, in Pakistani perception an India sympathizer, and one who has failed to curb the warlords – his obviously ineffective leadership is part of the problem in Afghanistan.

Second, how the attack on Afghanistan was planned and Operation Enduring Freedom launched. Rashid details behind the scene workings of UN, Northern Alliance (NA) and the US and the process bringing Europeans on board to set the stage for Bonn Peace Process. The outcome was a victory for NA which controls and exercises real power, while Karzai representing the majority Pashtuns gets symbolic and constricted presidency laden with



good intentions. He informs how the exclusion of Taliban from the Bonn Peace process was regretted by Lakhdar Brahimi—the principal UN negotiator. Third, the role and relationship of US – Pakistan, European and other intelligence agencies, but exhibits special disdain for ISI and its patronage and connection with religious militants of all hues and how in concert they are igniting chaos not only in Pakistan but also in the 'region'. Spellbound by all these accounts, one keeps wondering; is ISI such a formidable intelligence agency that Rashid and others would like us to believe? Ahmed Rashid's critique of US policy is a friendly one, pleading for a receptive ear to listen and manage the war on terror more effectively. His critique of Pakistani policy reflects despondency and hopelessness – an ailment beyond correction, hence the disdain. Fourth, Rashid is upfront in giving detailed description of events, persons and circumstances which clearly show that Bush administration was neither serious nor prepared to promote democracy and nation building. In reality the US has been consistent in supporting anti-democratic and dictatorial regimes. Fifth, he is forceful in arguing with supporting evidence that by design and occasionally by default, the warlords in Afghanistan were strengthened by CIA and Pentagon. He cites the case of Kandahar's Gul Agha Sherazai, who according to Rashid *"endeared himself to the U.S commanders in the city by giving them everything they needed. He was soon earning an estimated \$1.5 million a month for providing building materials, fuel and other items. Gravel needed to repair the Kandahar runway costing eight dollars a truckload was sold to the base of one hundred dollars – and some three truckloads a day were being delivered."* P 136. Sixth, consequently, drug trafficking and arms smuggling has become an enterprise with Afghanistan as the hub, and the 'region' as the major conduit. Seventh, Rashid gives lucid details on how and why pre-mature US involvement in Iraq, has led to the resurgent Taliban militancy. Finally, the cumulative effect has been that failure of the US – NATO and Pakistan's policies; on the one side has caused resurgence of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and on the other has led to escalation of violence in the tribal areas of Pakistan. **Descent into Chaos** is real, its spread is cancerous and must be arrested, and time is running out. Rashid provides an excellent analysis of how & why the chaos is coming but pays little attention on how it could be arrested? How democracy and nation building may be pursued?

“ Chaos theorists and state failure literature impels us to not only rethink policies that have brought Pakistan, Afghanistan and the entire 'region' to this point of turmoil. But also invites us to re-conceptualize the state with corresponding policies that ensures internal and regional stability. ”

Chaos theorists and state failure literature impels us to not only rethink policies that have brought Pakistan, Afghanistan and the entire 'region' to this point of turmoil. But also invites us to re-conceptualize the state with corresponding policies that ensures internal and regional stability. Learning from the best practices of states that have become models of success – Singapore, South Korea, Czech Republic would tell us much about leadership and policy formulation. The challenges that the 'region' is confronted with are; authoritarian politics not simply authoritarian regimes, massive youth unemployment, outdated and crumbling public education system, a religious establishment resisting reform and a mounting tide of a small number but effective Islamic extremists who glorify the cult of death by recruiting youth to commit suicide bombings mostly against other fellow Muslims. In societies like ours where the state is increasingly failing to provide welfare and security to its citizens, the onus is on civil society, intellectuals, publicists and media to monitor and oversee the process of policy making. Ahmed Rashid's book is a clarions call for the coalition government and the political parties. Their leadership needs to be more vigilant and active in debating and developing consensus on policy making related to combating terrorism and religious militancy, improving governance and subordinating the role of intelligence agencies to the parliament. The ensuing chaos and crisis offers the coalition government a unique opportunity to develop alternatives to the existing policies – this new administration has about twelve months (6months already gone) to muster the will and support to change the policy direction else it would be an opportunity lost, both for Pakistan and the region.





## Note on the Environment

### Rickshaws in Lahore: Source of Air Quality and Noise Pollution

Raheem ul Haque

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Lahore's results based on its May 26 – June 6, 2008 testing fail to meet the standards set by World Health Organization (WHO). With an ozone reading of 127.4ug/m<sup>3</sup> (micro-gram's per cubic meter) exceeding the WHO guideline of 100ug/m<sup>3</sup>, level of sulphur dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>) at 56.40ug/m<sup>3</sup> against WHO guideline of 20ug/m<sup>3</sup> and the annual level of nitrous oxides (NO<sub>2</sub>) at 112.50ug/m<sup>3</sup> against WHO guideline of 25ug/m<sup>3</sup>, emission levels in Lahore are three times the safety levels set by WHO. Regarding noise pollution, certain sites in Karachi have a noise level of 120 decibels against the 80 to 85 decibels maximum limit for humans. The study also found that 40 % of traffic cops had a high hearing level while 70 per cent of rickshaw drivers (driving for more than 10 years) had partial hearing impairment.

According to the EPA, buses using diesel fuel and the 2-Stroke rickshaws are the main culprits not adhering to the following EPA mandated emission levels.

- Smoke: 40% or 2 on Ringelmann Scale at a distance of 6 meters or more
- Carbon Monoxide: 4.5% for new and 6% for used vehicles
- Noise: 85 dB with sound meter at 7.5 meter from the source

This preliminary research note provides an assessment of Rickshaws and their impact on air quality and noise pollution levels in Lahore.

#### Rickshaw Sub-sector

According to the Excise and Taxation Department's (ETD) registration list, there are around 66,000 rickshaws in Lahore. Exact figure is unknown as some rickshaws are not registered. 2-Stroke rickshaws which carry an environmental concern are estimated at around 50,000, 4-Stroke at 13,000 while the rest are legal ChandGaris. Most rickshaws are driven by a single driver, though few

of the rickshaws leased to drivers for a daily rent of Rs 150 (2-Stroke) and Rs 200-250 (4-Stroke) may have two 12 hour shifts. Thus 2-Stroke rickshaw drivers exceed 50,000. Though a Rickshaw Driver's Union exists, only about 20% of rickshaw drivers are its members.

The 2-Stroke rickshaw mechanics and Khiradias (part maker) number around 5,000. A 2-Stroke engine is air cooled rather than a 4-Stroke water cooled engine, thus 2-Stroke mechanics can not support 4-Stroke rickshaw. In addition there are around fifty Body Makers and a dozen Painters who can ply their trade for both rickshaws.



*Khiradia at work*

The rickshaw dealers sell both new and second hand rickshaws at a lump sum price or in installments. Currently, the Anjuman-e-Tajran Auto Rickshaw Dealers, the main representative body has about 150 members.

About 40 4-Stroke rickshaw manufacturers are registered including some of the twelve 2-Stroke rickshaw manufacturers who have adopted 4-Stroke technology. Manufacturers have created a 3S (Sales, Spares & Services), 2S and 1S network to support their customers. For 2-Stroke rickshaw though, there are independent spare parts dealers who support all makes and models.

#### Regulatory Framework

Rickshaw, as a Public Service Vehicle (PSV) has a strict regulatory framework. The Engineering Development

Board (EDB) is responsible for approving the facility and import features of the manufacturer. The Pakistan Standards and Quality Control Authority (PSQCA) audits product quality including noise and emissions, manufacturing process, materials used and man power qualification according to the PSQCA Standard 4708 for three wheelers. PSQCA issues a 1 year certificate of approval and is mandated to revalidate it by visiting the facility four times a year.

The Department of Transport Punjab is responsible for giving a PSV certificate to a product after it has been approved by the PSQCA. A technical team comprising of the EPA and the Transport Department is also mandated to ensure technical specifications and environmental standards of the product before it can be registered as a PSV. This team reports to the technical committee comprising of Provincial Transport Authority, EPA and Traffic Police.

Once the product is approved as a PSV, the Provincial and District Transport Authorities are responsible for managing the PSV according to the Motor Vehicle Rules 1969.

- Registration: Each new rickshaw has to be registered with the Excise and Taxation Department (ETD), Punjab.
- Token: A kind of road tax is collected by the ETD amounting to Rs 360 a year.
- Route Permit: A permit to drive in a city is required from District Regional Transport Authority (A local government department) costing Rs. 1,050 for 3 years.
- Fitness (Passing): Each rickshaw has to pass a fitness test conducted by the Motor Vehicle Examiner every six months costing Rs 250 a year.

### Punjab Government's Policy Initiative

Over the years, a number of initiatives had been undertaken to limit 2-Stroke rickshaw pollution without success. The Lahore High Court in response to a writ petition had established the Lahore Clean Air Commission in January 2003 which finalized its recommendation in May 2005. It recommended immediate introduction of 4-Stroke

rickshaws and phasing out of 2-Stroke rickshaws in one year.

The Department of Transport had already banned 2-Stroke rickshaw registration in January 2005 but was granted till December 2007 to remove all 2-Stroke rickshaws from Lahore. In addition a petition claiming that the ban would affect the poor rickshaw driver's livelihood was rejected on the grounds of Government's undertaking to use its Green Fund to encourage poor and deserving candidates to buy 4-Stroke rickshaws, while giving preference to the affectees – the 2-Stroke rickshaw drivers. The 4-Stroke CNG rickshaw entered the market in 2005 while the suggestion of converting 2-Stroke to 4-Stroke CNG rickshaw was declined due to want of technology. The court also ordered to set up Ambient Air Quality, Vehicular Emission and Fuel Standards by 2007 and to take effective measures for inspection & monitoring stations within a year.

The Punjab Government's plan envisaged 100,000 4-Stroke rickshaws on the streets in three years. As 4-Stroke rickshaws became available, the government gradually closed the main city arteries to 2-Stroke, thus executing the plan to eventually remove them from five major cities. Additionally 2-Stroke rickshaw was also banned from GOR1, Cantonment and Defense Housing Authority. *It is worth noting that the December 2007 deadline has passed and 2-Stroke rickshaws still make up the majority of rickshaws on the streets of Lahore.*

To encourage 4-Stroke rickshaws, the government started the Chief Minister Green Punjab Scheme in May 2006 with a five year budget of more than Rs. 1 Billion. The scheme involved three financial institutions. The Punjab Small Industries Corporation (PSIC) and Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank (PPCB) provided an upfront subsidy of 20,000 on the down payment, while the Bank of Punjab (BoP), waived interest on 75% of the equity cost. The government also negotiated a price of Rs. 125,000 without GST with rickshaw manufacturers to further subsidize 4-Stroke rickshaw leasing.

*The CPPG is in the process of finalizing a comprehensive report on the Rickshaw Sub-sector in Lahore which provides a critical evaluation of Punjab Government's policy and gives recommendations.*

The Rickshaw market



## Visitors and Activities

May 14th, 2008

The Director, CPPG spoke at a workshop on *Enabling people to decide their future course* organized by the Punjab Rural Support Program in Gujranwala.

May 27th, 2008

The Director, CPPG spoke at the Civil Services Academy, Walton, Lahore on the syndicate report on *Creeping Talibanization In Pakistan*

June 3rd – 4th, 2008

The Director, CPPG participated in a seminar on *Peace between India and Pakistan on the model of Postwar Franco-German Rapprochement* at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS).

July 24th, 2008

*Dr. Ishrat Hussain*, Director Institute of Business Administration (IBA) held a discussion on academic issues in social sciences with the CPPG and senior FC College faculty, Dr. Aslam Chaudhry, Dr. Anwar Rao and Dr. Rehan Siddiqi.

June 27th, 2008

The Research Fellow, CPPG attended a talk on *Selling Off Another Piece Of Our World* by Najma Sadeque organized by the The Green Economics & Globalization Initiative of Shirkat Gah in collaboration with Simorgh at the HRCP Auditorium, Lahore.

August 11th, 2008

*Mr. Tariq Sultan*, Former Chairman Punjab Service Commission of Pakistan (PSCP) visited the Centre and exchanged views on the CPPG Research & Training Programs.

August 18th, 2008

*Mr. Musharraf Rasool*, Former Chief Economist, N.W.F.P and a PhD candidate at the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies. Georgia State University visited the Centre.

August 20th, 2008

*Mr. Fareed Mahmood*, Additional Secretary Labor, currently doing his masters in Public Policy at Columbia University, visited the Centre.

August 21st, 2008

The Director, CPPG presided over the concluding session of the launch of *Pakistan Demographic & Health Survey 2006-07* at Lahore Pearl Continental Hotel, organized by National Institute of Population Studies & United States Agency for International Development. The inaugural session was presided by the Secretary Population, Govt. of Pakistan.

August 23rd, 2008

The Director, CPPG was invited to discuss the *Crises of the Pakistani State* with youth activists at the Institute for Peace and Secular Studies (IPSS) organized Political School held at the HRCP, Lahore.

August 26th, 2008

*Mr. Tariq Mahmood*, former Federal Secretary Communications and Interior and currently Member Punjab Public Service Commission visited the Centre and exchanged views on CPPG programs.

August 28th, 2008

The Director, CPPG was invited by the Planning & Development Department, Govt. of Punjab to comment on a paper presentation *Study on Competitiveness & Structural Transformation in Pakistan* by Prof. Jesus Felipe and Riccardo Hausmann.

### Forthcoming Events

Dec 2 – 4, 2008

The Ninth Annual Population Research Conference organized by Population Association of Pakistan (PAP) in collaboration with CPPG will be held at FC College (A chartered University) on *Population Dynamics and Security: Public Policy Challenges*.

## Faculty & Staff

Professor & Director

**Dr. Saeed Shafqat**

> PhD University of Pennsylvania

Research Fellow

**Raheem ul Haque**

> Masters Intl. Public Policy, SAIS,  
Johns Hopkins University

Associate Research Fellow

**Aneel Salman**

> Doctoral Candidate,  
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)

Administrative Assistant

**Suleman Sadiq**

> MCS Michigan Intl. College

## Contact Us

Centre for Public Policy & Governance (CPPG)

E – 017 & 018

F.C. College (A chartered University)

Feroz pur road, Lahore – 54600

Phone: 042. 923 1581 – 88 Ext. 388

Email: fc.cppg@gmail.com

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