

Quarterly

Research
& News

Centre for Public Policy & Governance

Forman Christian College (A Chartered University)

ISSN 2076-9997

Number 05 & 06
July 2009

From the Director's Desk

It gives me pleasure to inform our readers that the Centre for Public Policy and Governance is ready to launch its one year Executive MA in Public Policy from Fall 2009 (in fact we are hopeful that by the time this issue is published the first batch will be in session). We have been working on the curriculum and course design of the program for almost two years. I take this opportunity to thank Dr. Peter Armacost, the Rector for unflinching support and guidance, members of the Board of Advanced Studies for constructive and helpful comments in improving the content and structure of the courses and the members of the Academic Council for final scrutiny and approval. We remain deeply appreciative of the guidance and support of these academic bodies, and with your continued support, we shall strive to make our Executive MA in Public Policy program locally relevant and globally competitive.

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CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
AND GOVERNANCE

Pakistani National Identity: Muslim, Multilingual and Multicultural?

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In South Asia, it is religion, more than nationalism that persists as identity maker. Resultantly, nationalist aspirations are couched in religious and ideological overtones, which in turn erode the culture of tolerance in South Asian societies. This has given birth to the exclusion and marginalization of some groups (particularly, religious and ethnic minorities) within Pakistan.

The persistent instrumentalization of religion has produced contradictory, conflictual and competitive social forces in a number of South Asian states where, on the one hand, religious minorities (Ahmadis, Hindus and Christians in the case of Pakistan, Muslims in the case of India) and ethnic groups (i.e. Sindhis & Baloch in Pakistan) feel excluded and marginalized, and, on the other hand, compete to access state resources. These social forces have conflicting visions about the role of religion in their societies and, increasingly, the trend is to enforce an exclusivist ideological nationalism rather than seek reconciliation, accommodation or power sharing. Two critical questions are how, and why, the state in South Asia instrumentalizes religion to promote nationalism? How does this lead to a culture of intolerance and the exclusion of many citizen groups from the nation building process?

To address these questions, I will focus primarily on the experience of Pakistan, where religious groups and the state – sometimes independently and at others times in concert – continue to invoke religion to patronize some groups while excluding others. The state instrumentalizes religion for the purpose of building nationalism, while competing visions shape the process of exclusion and inclusion in pursuit of defining national identity and promoting nationalism. Thus contestation on 'Who is a Pakistani' and why Pakistani identity is nebulous continues to be an important source of discourse among scholars on Pakistan¹.

For purposes of brevity and conceptual clarity, let me identify three types of groups and the ways in which they

compete and pursue their goals, and in the process may cause the exclusion and marginalization of their competitors;

1. The Islamists
2. The Pluralists
3. The Nation-Statists.

The Islamists:

The proponents of this group argue that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam and that remains the only binding force. They maintain that sole reason for the creation of Pakistan was preserving 'Islam' and not simply 'Muslims of un-divided India' as opposed to Hindus; they prefer Islamic belief over group as the primary source of identity. Therefore they assert and demand enforcement of Islamic Shariah (laws). According to this school, following and accepting the centralizing role of Islam could harmonize the country's ethnic and linguistic diversity. Islamic ideology is presented as a panacea for ethnic demands and political and socio-economic ills. This group invokes the Objectives Resolution (March 12th, 1949) and asserts that Pakistan was "founded in the name of Islam". Among Pakistani rulers, General Zia-ul Haq (1977-88) is recognized as the most ardent promoter of this school. (Paradoxically, both civilian and military regimes in Pakistan have also utilized Islam as 'official ideology' and as a policy choice to counter demands for ethnic and cultural autonomy.) The supporters of the Islamist school use Islamic ideology to suppress ethnic and cultural pluralism and thus encourage centralization, authoritarianism and anti-federation sentiment. Two influential writings illustrate this point. Justice (retired) Javid Iqbal has made a revisionist interpretation of the Two Nation Theory by arguing that Islam provides a "common spiritual aspiration" and, as such, the issue of national identity must be resolved in the context of Islamic values. It is within this context that Islamic ideology and nationalism get used interchangeably. In a more nuanced style, Professor Fateh Mohammad Malik has coined a new phrase, the "Islamian-e-Hind," for the "Muslims of India". He claims that based on Islamic identity and ideology, Islamian-e-Hind demanded a separate homeland for Muslims through 'democratic struggle'. Thus Malik gives

an Islamic and ideological color to the Pakistan Movement and vigorously claims that today their (Pakistanis) survival is also tied to protecting and defending this ideological unity.² Javid Iqbal and Professor Malik uphold the relevance of the Two Nation Theory and Islam in defining Pakistani identity; reinforcing the Islamist view, but a more disturbing factor is that both Javid Iqbal and Malik seemingly prefer centralization rather than pluralism. Thus for Islamists centralization and ideologically driven unity remains principle tenet of nationhood.

The Pluralists:

This group is composed of those who argue that Pakistan does not have a single culture and highlight its pluralist content and character. They argue that Pakistan is a multilingual and multicultural state; therefore, its languages and cultures should be allowed to grow and develop in the broader context of national history and cultural experiences. They contend that the regional cultures and Islam have been in existence prior to the creation of Pakistan and both can flourish together. From this perspective, it is not Islamization but greater decentralization and enhanced provincial autonomy that would promote national integration and give substance to Pakistani national identity. This view has gained momentum and legitimacy in post 1971 Pakistan but not sufficient success and recognition; people have become more assertive about projecting and protecting their ethnic demands and rights. The outcome of the February 18th 2008 elections and the victory of the Pakistan Peoples Party(PPP),the Pakistan Muslim League-N(PML-N), the Awami National Party(ANP) and the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) has given new confidence and promise to Pluralist thinking and ideals. It is disturbing to observe that the political parties and their leadership have been passive and slow in demonstrating a spirit of accommodation, reconciliation and harmony that continues to elude Pakistani political elites. Yet, the continuity and sustenance of parliamentary political process holds signs of promise whereby the creation of Gilgit-Baltistan province, agreement and announcement of 7th NFC Award and November 23rd Baluchistan Package could be considered as important initial steps towards the pluralist-federal ideal. Will the Pluralist forces prevail

and redefine the soul and substance of Pakistani national identity? While conceiving to implement these steps the resistance from Islamists and the Nation-Statists must not be under estimated.


“ Will the Pluralist forces prevail and redefine the soul and substance of Pakistani national identity? ”

The Nation-Statists:

This group argues that nation-building and national identity can be understood by focusing on Pakistan's antagonism towards India. According to this school, Pakistan "relies more on anti-Indian nationalism than on national integration." The logic of the argument is that ethnic divergence is so strong that hardly anything binds Pakistan together internally, and anti-Indian nationalism is the only binding force; it is "nationalism without a nation"³. This position is one-dimensional and overplays the role of the perceived enemy in defining Pakistani national identity. It merits attention that this position has been utilized by the civil and military regimes in Pakistan through state controlled television and other media outlets to produce 'enemy images' and to promote exclusion. This view has been dominant and potent both in defining national identity and promoting exclusionary nationalism. But in this age of satellites, fax, email and internet it is losing ground. As citizens, particularly the younger generation, have access to alternate channels, the dynamics of defending and defining Pakistani nationhood and identity are increasingly internal and global and not simply anti-Indian. The very logic of this school promotes exclusion and marginalization by invoking the imagery, fear and hatred of the 'enemy'. Both the Islamists and the Nation-Statists remain a potent force in shaping the contours of and discourse on Pakistani national identity.

Given these dynamics, it needs to be borne in mind that competing ethnicities do not mean the absence of a nation-state but indicate that multiple identities reflect another complex facet of the nation building process.

Taking a cue from the nationally celebrated and respected poet Faiz Ahmad Faiz, let me construct a model of Pakistani national identity⁴. It is multifaceted and formed in concentric circles, approaching one, opens the door to another. In Pakistani case, the inner most circle is that of Islamic values, which comprises the nucleus of values; espousing social justice and tolerance, respect for women, protection of minority religions and underprivileged and the right to dissent; the second circle is that of our regional cultures, languages / ethnicities and folk heritage. It is a vital component of identity formation, whereby regional languages compete and converge to steer the path of national identity. The outermost circle is that of Pakistani territoriality, national history and shared heritage.



For internal contestation and the maximization of demands, rights, representation and interests, Mohajir, Punjabi, Pathan, Sindhi, Baluch, and even Saraiki and Kashmiri ethnicities are invoked. Yet these ethnicities do not vie with Pakistani nationhood and reflect the evolving dynamics of multiple identities in Pakistan⁵. Ethnic struggles and demands are increasingly recognised as legitimate instruments to seek a fair share of economic and cultural resources in Pakistan. The formation of the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONAM) for example, was a manifestation of this phenomenon.⁶ In the broader context both the 'real' and 'imagined' threats to the nation-state stir up symbols of nationalism. Today Pakistanis are more conscious of their territoriality and distinct geopolitical personality than ever before. The sources of pride and patriotism are internal, rooted in the territory that constitutes Pakistan – and not simply anti-Indian. The more we look at Pakistan through the

lens of territory and domestic culture, the more coherent and integrated our identity becomes. Here one needs to look at the geographical compactness, contiguity, historical and political circumstances that make contemporary Pakistan a distinct civilization (Ghandara, Harapa and Mohenjodaro) and geopolitical entity. This has led some analysts to project and portray Pakistan as a transitory zone between South Asia, Middle East and Central Asia. These proponents overplay Islamic civilizational linkages and distance from South Asia's Hindu roots.⁷ Others are vigorous in arguing that Pakistan is historically embedded in Islamic and South Asian cultural heritage, centered on the Indus river system. Thus, civilizationally and geographically, Pakistanis embody and personify the "Indus Person".⁸ Evidently both recognize the territorial basis of Pakistani nationalism; however, the contest is on choosing the role of Islam and the degree of Islamization, its direction and orientation, particularly the monstrous wave of Talibanization. This is an issue that Pakistanis must come to grips with.

This makes it all the more important to recognize the complexity of linkages and relationships among ethnicity, Islam and territoriality to understand the interplay of social and political forces that influence the processes of nation building and identity formation.

I have argued that Pakistani national identity is increasingly multilayered and multilingual, and the dynamics are primarily domestic although external factors do play a role in rousing nationalist fervour. Ethnic contestation and assimilation are continuous and simultaneous processes that reflect the dynamism of Pakistani identity and struggles of nationhood. It is remarkable and comforting that both in-

“ Today Pakistanis are more conscious of their territoriality and distinct geopolitical personality than ever before. The sources of pride and patriotism are internal, rooted in the territory that constitutes Pakistan – and not simply anti-Indian. ”

ternal dynamics and external influences are competing in shaping Pakistani national identity – A Pakistani is in tandem territorial, Muslim and ethnically/culturally pluralist. Pakistanis need to understand and ingrain in their minds that the geography of their nationhood is distinct. It was meaningful at the time of independence and it is resilient today. It is disconcerting that Islamists and the Nation-Statists continue to trivialize these pluralist dimensions and multiple facets of Pakistani national identity, thus expounding an exclusionary ideology from powerful positions within the nation. The outcome of the February 18th, 2008 elections has provided the Pluralist school and its adherents an opportunity to encourage inclusion of marginalized groups and communities to rekindle the federalist spirit in Pakistan. It should also mean engaging Islamists and Nation-Statists for building a minimal consensus and developing a shared vision on nationhood to disrupt, dismantle and defeat the creeping Talibanization. Such an approach could improve the prospects of governance and restrict the size of ungovernable spaces. Will the political leaders, policy makers, intellectuals and civil society activists seize the opportunity and make the celebration of diversity a norm for Pakistani national identity? This remains the question.

“ A Pakistani is in tandem territorial, Muslim and ethnically / culturally pluralist. ”

* A slightly revised version of this paper was presented at the Regional Conference on Pluralism in South Asia organized by the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka in collaboration with Canadian High Commission in Colombo March 24-25th, 2008. In October 2009, this paper was presented to a policy dialog group organized by Alternate Solutions in Lahore. I am grateful to audiences at both places for useful comments and critique. The author is deeply appreciative of the comments and suggestions given by Raheem ul Haque and Sadi Mirza, which helped him reconfigure his ideas and argument.

- ¹ .For a rigorous, analytical and well researched interpretation and evaluation on the subject see, Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan* (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), particularly chapter 2, "Who is Pakistani? Culture and Identity", pp 46-80.
- ² Javid Iqbal, *Islam and Pakistan's Identity* (Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan/Vanguard Books, 2003) Professor Fateh M. Malik, *Fikri Tangdasti aur Nazreeati Baygani ka Mausam* (Islamabad: Doosat Publications, 2001) pp34-54. This Urdu book has a series of five essays vigorously defending Two Nation Theory and challenging in particular the views of Altaf Hussain, the MQM leader, who has been vocal in criticizing this theory.
- ³ Christophe Jaffrelot, *Nationalism without a Nation* (New Delhi/ London: Manohar/Zed Books, 2002) pp7-8 & 42
- ⁴ Sheema Majeed, *Interviews with Faiz Ahmad Faiz* (Lahore: Ferozesons, 1988) pp 74-78. (in Urdu)
- ⁵ The case of Pashtun and Baloch banding together when they confront the federal government, while within Baluchistan the two ethnic groups compete and contest. For an informative discussion on the role of religion, ethnic factors and developmental goals see, Paul Titus (Editor), *Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Political Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan* (Karachi, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) van den Bergh. 2004. Optimal climate policy is a utopia: from quantitative to qualitative cost-benefit analysis. *Ecological Economics* 48, 385-393.
- ⁶ The PONAM was formed in July 1998, when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced that the government would build the controversial Kalabagh Dam. This announcement banded together, the Sindhi nationalists, NWFP Paktoonkha, Baluch nationalists and Saraiki movement leaders. A somewhat loose and diverse alliance of relatively progressive but minor political parties which spoke about the rights of the under represented ethnic groups. Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal, Mahmud Achazai, Qadir Magsi, Dr.Hye Baloch are some leading leaders and voices of PONAM. More recently on December 25th, 2009, 16 leftist and progressive political parties and their leaders from all the four provinces met in Lahore to form a larger alliance of nationalist and progressive forces. A small but important step towards revamping the federation. "16 Progressive Parties discuss merger" *Dawn*, Lahore, Saturday, December 26th, 2009.
- ⁷ Shahid Javed Burki, "Moving towards West Asia" *Dawn* online edition February 12, 2002. Burki wrote a series of articles on the subject arguing that for reasons of religio-cultural affinity and economic opportunity, Pakistan "should look to West Asia rather than South Asia".
- ⁸ Aitzaz Ahsan, *The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan* (Karachi, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) Dr. KF Yusuf, *Towards A Tripolar World* (Lahore: Tariq Publishing House, 1975) pp1-17. Hamza Alavi, "Ethnicity, Muslim society and Pakistan ideology" in Anita Weiss (ed), *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: the application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1987) pp 21-47

Faculty Seminar Series

: **Dr. Nadeem ul Haque**, a senior advisor with the IMF was invited as a distinguished guest speaker under the CPPG Faculty Seminar Series on January 28, 2009. He gave a talk on *Rethinking Development Strategy*.

Dr. Haque started by defining the structural issues of the Pakistani economy. He categorized Pakistan's economy as a boom and bust economy, which had yet to break the begging bowl. Its growth was directly linked to external aid inflows during the 60s, 80s, and then 2000s managing up to 7% growth. He observed that during times of low aid inflows, the country was forced to go back to the IMF for help. Resultantly, poverty indicators had not changed much in the last 60 years. While a small number of poor came out of poverty during times of growth, a long-term sustained change had yet to occur. For decades the fiscal deficit had stood at 8-10% (of GDP) and kept the economy in a vicious debt trap that on occasions had only been temporarily relieved through debt rescheduling. Under these conditions little effort had been made to redesign and revamp the existing cropping, industrial and export structures.

Making a critical appraisal of civilian and military regimes' economic policies he argued that their concentration was on a flawed economic policy; which equated strategy with acquiring financing & donor funding, with revamped sectoral policies and with investing capital in industry or agriculture. Dr. Haque asserted that in actuality it was the deep inertia within existing production and economic structures, which restrained sustained economic growth while keeping poverty and income distribution untouched.

He lamented the fact that because of a weak research culture, we did not have indigenous and reality grounded thinking on policy issues. He argued that the thinking sectors in the economy were poor and research generation was not valued owing to a lack of State support for think tanks, universities and researchers. Even the military did not have a policy and looked for the nearest possible avenue for policy formulation when it came into power. It was ironic that the political parties did not think of policy preparation and formulation when out of power. Conse-

quently, donors took the lead and emerged as think tanks to fill this research gap in Pakistan. Thus considering that domestic thinkers were not involved in picking up local ideas while ownership of domestic policy development did not exist, it was only natural that policy agenda was set by donor driven research catering to donor needs and thinking.

“ ... domestic thinkers were not involved in picking up local ideas while ownership of domestic policy development did not exist, it was only natural that policy agenda was set by donor driven research catering to donor needs and thinking.”

He was critical of the role of the Planning Commission as a policy think tank and claimed that it still followed a thirty year old growth strategy concentrating on sector selection and capital acquisition for investment. Drawing the attention of the audience to new growth literature he remarked that it did not pay much attention to machines, money, stages of production or sector picking, instead concentrating on fixing the fundamentals of an integrated economy.

Given this premise, Haque argued for radically changing the perspective around policy making identifying five concepts that were crucial for sustainable growth and ought to be used as indicators to judge an economy.

1. *The principle of Property Rights* as the basis of every economy as well as of the system of law & order and justice. Regarding Government's initiative of computerization of land records, he argued that it was but a small part as Property Rights entailed title guarantee, and feasible, speedy and just transactions. But the Pakistani State did not provide title sanctity, as exemplified by a board installed outside an open plot stating 'Not for Sale: Property of FC College'. He argued that such examples where the owner had to advertise ownership meant a lack of Property Rights.

2. *Competitive Markets*, not just financial but all commodities including land, agriculture, industrial products and services were extremely important for an economy. The choice was not between Free Markets or Government Monopoly but instead government's task was to fix markets to make them competitive, removing monopolies and oligopolies. In Pakistan, the land market could not function well because property rights were not well defined; some industries such as the car industry were monopolies while the government interfered in agriculture markets constantly by fixing government acquisition price of wheat.

3. *Knowledge* meant the acceptance of reason and scientific method within society. It did not at all mean latest technology while socio-cultural ideas continued to belong to the dark ages. Instead it meant a friendly and facilitating attitude towards knowledge, research and critical thinking. He highlighted the case of non-recognition of Dr. Abdus Salam who lies in an unmarked grave as an example of a knowledge indifferent society.

4. *Transport and Communication* led to better, faster transactions and easier exchange of information. Better logistics decreased transactional costs thus supporting economic growth.

5. *Similarly Community and Local Social Capital* also facilitated lower transactional costs in an economy by building trust among the populace through community building, associations and enhanced ability for teamwork. Instead, trust had been decreasing in Pakistani society.

“ The choice was not between Free Markets or Government Monopoly but instead government's task was to fix markets to make them competitive, removing monopolies and oligopolies. ”

Moving on to the methodological process for policy formulation, he identified six different methodologies to approach economic behavior. He remarked that in the Pakistani case the current decision making either lacked structure or used dated methodologies. He suggested exploring *New Economics* which redefined wealth as improved well-being and environmental sustainabil-

ity rather than just having and consuming more things, *Experimental Economics* which moved beyond the rational and included social, community and networking aspects of human behavior, *Institutional Economics* which suggested thinking of institutions as a source that shaped economic behavior, *Game Theory* which discussed strategic behavior assuming that success in making choices depended on the choices of others, *Complexity* which went against sector picking focusing instead on how to affect behavior of an integrated economic whole and lastly *Economic Geography* which included uneven and clustered development in the analysis arguing that urban will be more productive than rural and thus looking at cities as a cluster rather than an amorphous space.

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Shifting his analysis to the role of various Actors in economic policy formulation and management, Haque stated that the *Government and Opposition* spent more time on economic pronouncements than actual economic thinking. *Bureaucracy* was too politically dependent for its own survival, always worried about politicians' or army's onslaught that it was not capable of taking important and hard decisions and thus properly managing the economy. In the last three years, the average tenure of the planning secretary was about three months, which made economic planning impossible. Though the Army got heavily involved in policy making, its lack of thinking capability in terms of economic policy led it to recruit a banker to run the economy. Additionally because of the army's huge economic enterprise with a vested interest to secure state subsidies for its businesses, army had a conflict of interest and could never be an honest broker in devising the country's economic policy. *Landlords and Industrialists* had lost the ability to be change agents because most were dependent on State subsidy.

Summing up, Dr. Haque said, these actors only had one thing in common and that was to lobby the government for Rent Seeking – individual benefits not conducive to market fair play. The political economy of the country tied all these actors in a Rent Seeking game while the *Academia* was fragmented, disheartened and unwanted except by the donors and thus could not conceive domestic solutions and indigenous ideas for change. He argued that while there were regular well attended seminars in all countries including India, such tradition was lacking in Pakistan except when a donor held it (CPPG Monthly Seminar Series was an exceptional case!). Instead there was only one organized societal agent, the social scientist cum policy maker with a clear interest and a gaining influence that informed sections had been unable to challenge, the *Mullah*. This scenario did not present a hopeful picture for a youthful nation, with 67% of the 170 million below the age of thirty, as many as 30–40% below the poverty line and 50% never having been to school.

“Ideas always preceded reforms and thus there was no hope for a society ripe for change but without ideas.”

Having defined the malaise that pervaded economic thinking, policy formulation methodology and agent interests, Haque declared that he had more questions than solutions. His argument being that ideas and research widely understood and debated over time led to change. Ideas always preceded reforms and thus there was no hope for a society ripe for change but without ideas. Then he raised two critical questions:

1. What are the mechanisms of governance and laws that preserve Rent Seeking?
2. What are the mechanisms of exclusion of the poor?

In trying to provide an answer to these questions, he outlined his three point reform agenda.

First, Haque began dissecting the State by asking specific questions. Does the State have a social contract? Does this social contract include the poor? When the State borrows,

is it for you or me or is it to keep Rent Seeking alive? Giving an example of the 1990s when Pakistan borrowed and defaulted on \$11B of its own people and \$40B of international lending, he suggested that researchers and academics had not even asked why. Elaborating to make a case for research and structural change, he argued that a simple economic model could be built to assess how a different exchange rate policy, approach to economic management and distribution of income would have precluded the need for borrowing. But fixing the State did not mean that it should take over the Market and thus it was also important to understand the relationship between the State and the Market. Though provision of Public Goods (Magisterial- security of life, property and contract, Social- education and health, Infrastructural- roads) was the responsibility of the State, the means of provision should be based on the two important questions of Rent Seeking and exclusion of the poor. He argued that the State should actually withdraw from the Market limiting Rent Seeking and play its role as the ultimate arbiter of conflict while making sure that the poor were not excluded. But this required deep reforms in the State because constitution was the fundamental framework driving the economy and thus a speedy judicial system, an elite independent police system and working regulatory institutions free of corruption were essential prerequisites.

Second, in terms of *Rent Seeking*, he was clear that State subsidies especially those creating monopolies through protection such as the automobile industry needed to be removed. Similarly *the system of special ministerial and army & civil bureaucratic privileges needed to give way to a single monetary payment as these facilitated invisible means of accumulating power*. Hidden payments meant that people have to extract resources for themselves creating grounds for Rent Seeking and professional compromises. He gave the example of the Land Distribution System, which he considered to be one of the most important forms of Rent Seeking. In simple terms, it used the Land Acquisition Act, the Government's Right of Domain to give land (money) to its members at cheap prices, amounting to robbing the poor to give to the rich. Additionally this encompassed an invisible means of distribution creating huge incentives for nepotism as a large number of people were spending resources to become part of this land distribution system. As a remedy to remove Rent Seeking, he

suggested getting rid of the Land Acquisition Act and the DHA to allow market based land development system.

His third suggestion was to develop *Agencies of Change & a Constituency of Reform*. He argued that groups demanding change existed in all societies but we had not invested in them. Academia was one of these groups, but institutionally it was under the bureaucracy, which was not technical enough to demand or generate the right product. Additionally a lack of State funds for independent research made the academia beholden to the donors and inept of developing independent ideas and thought.

Having suggested a way forward, he ended on the note that it was thus important to move beyond sector picking and think of economy from a system and complexity stand point. Stating that it was only after research that we could start asking the right questions, he summed up that the government needed to devise, discuss and debate a growth strategy while making public sector reforms mainstream and the syllabi modern.

Dr. Haque's talk was followed by a vibrant question answer session. Regarding a question on whether he accepted the Infant Industry thesis, Haque argued that in principle subsidies led to Rent Seeking, thus the onus should be on the person asking for subsidies to prove that a particular infant industry was needed. He argued that we had been providing subsidies to industries for 60 years on the basis of this argument.

Answering a question "Where should we start from?" he stated that there was a need to move beyond Development Economics which prescribed particular dos and don'ts. It was important to understand *that economics*

was not engineering as it involved reaction functions of all members of society thus fitting more in the Complexity and Game Theory domain. There were no packed solutions and interventions were never simple. But it was important to look at structural issues and devise our own solutions. He gave China's example stating that they had used their own solutions learning from their mistakes in the process rather than importing donor based solutions.

Answering a question if Rent Seeking had become part of the national attitude, he argued that a much deeper social sciences agenda needed to be followed and only then could we provide reform agenda to policy makers for discussion and implementation. A big part of policy should be research as it did not make sense to do interventions before doing proper homework.

Answering a question on the need for Land Reform, he argued that there was a time when it was needed but that time had now passed and instead a Land Market was needed.

Answering another question: Why could there not be a people's based approach rather than knowledge based considering people already knew what they wanted. If people wanted land to till, why not give it to them through land reforms? Dr. Haque responded that the reason he was against the donor based model was primarily because academics needed to learn from the people and put forward home grown ideas. But the economy was a complex system, which required thorough research before a prescription could be put forward. He claimed he was arguing for new approaches to devising prescriptions as required prescriptions themselves were dynamic and changed over time.



: Dr. Kauser Abdulla Malik, Professor of Biotechnology, Forman Christian College (A Chartered University), who is also member Task Force on Agriculture, was invited to deliver a talk on *Challenges of Food Security and Performance of Agriculture: The case of Pakistan* on the 25th of February 2009 under the CPPG's Faculty Seminar Series.




Dr. Malik started by highlighting the importance of agriculture in development. Still agriculture had been ignored by domestic as well as international policy makers for the last 25 years partly because of the IT and telecom technology hype leading to funds depletion and resource constraints among agriculture research centers. This trend changed with the World Development Report 2008 brought out by the World Bank titled "Agriculture for Development", which reinstated the importance of Agriculture. The report established agricultural growth as the main engine for poverty reduction with cross-country econometric evidence indicating that GDP growth generated in agriculture was at least twice as effective in reducing poverty as that generated by other sectors. Additionally 75% of the world's poor lived in rural areas, mostly working in agriculture. Even with rural urban migration, the majority of the world's poor would still reside in rural areas at least until 2040. The same was true for Pakistan where almost 44% of the labor force was employed in Agriculture. But the importance of agriculture was not limited to the rural poor as agricultural performance was directly linked to food security, which affected everyone. Dr. Malik defined Food Security within the paradigm of Security, Vulnerability and Insecurity. *Food security exists when all people, at all times, have nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.* A community or household

became vulnerable to insecurity based on its capacity to withstand frequency and intensity of food price escalations. Vulnerability could lead to transitory food insecurity when there was a temporary inability to meet food needs, or worse chronic food insecurity when there was a long term and persistent inability to meet food requirements.

Food Security revolved around three stated independent dimensions: *Availability* of food, which was dependent on local production or imports; *Accessibility* to food, which involved governance and marketing of agricultural products; and *Affordability* of food, which was based on food prices and income levels. Explaining the rise of international food price index by 40 percent in 2007 and a further increase of about 50 percent in the first three months of 2008, he listed factors including diversion of grain to bio-fuel production, demand shift from traditional staples to high value foods like meat and milk, neglect of agricultural investment for productivity growth, and high income growth in some countries resulting in high food demand. Recognizing the importance of these factors he introduced another factor-- Speculation, arguing that within the current system of free market economy, price was not based on real supply and demand. Instead this man made crises was an outcome of futures trading on the Chicago Market where food grains of the coming two years were bought off.

Shifting his focus to Pakistan, Dr. Malik argued that Pakistan's resource base was not the issue as out of 198 million acres (MA) of land, 48 MA were under crop production, of which 28MA were irrigated and 14MA were salt affected. In terms of water, Pakistan had 100 million acre feet (MAF) availability, 60% of which came from the canal network while 40% came from tube wells. But the importance of canal water could not be overstated as only 25% of groundwater was fit for irrigation, 50% was totally unfit while another 25% was marginally better.

: Pakistan Cropping Pattern



Source: WRRRI-NARC / PARC

The cropping pattern consisted of two major cropping seasons (Kharif & Rabi) in a year supporting multiple combinations of food crops including wheat, rice, pulses and sugarcane. It could be ascertained from production history that over the last fifteen years, crop area of wheat and rice had more or less stayed constant while the yields had increased. In sugarcane though, the increase in area was due to installation of new sugar mills by influential parties against government regulations as sugarcane required more water. The crux of food security though depended on the comparison between production and consumption of major food items. This ratio was quite precarious for pulses (dependent on rain in Barani areas) and wheat, our staple food, while surplus rice was exported generating an income of about Rs. 3 Billion a year.




Legend

- Rice – wheat
- Rice – wheat (mix for kharif)
- Rice – wheat (mix for rabi)
- Rice – chickpea (mix for kharif and rabi)
- Wheat
- Coarse grain – wheat
- Coarse grain – wheat (mix for kharif and rabi)
- Coarse grain – wheat (mix for kharif)
- Cotton – wheat
- Cotton – wheat (mix for kharif and rabi)
- Cotton – wheat (mix for kharif and rabi)
- Maize – wheat
- Maize – wheat (mix for kharif and rabi)
- Maize – wheat (mix for kharif)
- Sugarcane – wheat (mix for kharif)
- Sugarcane – chickpea (mix for kharif and rabi)
- Groundnut – wheat (mix for kharif and rabi)
- Groundnut – wheat (mix for kharif)
- Minor Cultivation
- Minor Cultivation (mix for kharif)
- Sandy desert
- Data not available

In evaluating the 2008–09 season for wheat, Malik listed production estimate to be 21.8 million tons (MT) while total requirements were 24.26 MT including human consumption (21.66MT = 130kg/capita for 164.37 million people), seed requirements (1MT = 50kg/acre), poultry feed (0.1 MT), strategic reserves (1 MT) and official exports to Afghanistan (0.5 MT). This left a wheat deficit of 2.46 MT, which was still understated because the actual export to Afghanistan was estimated at 2MT raising the actual requirement to 25.76MT. With the increase in support price from Rs. 625 to Rs. 950, the target of 25 MT fully supporting our needs could be achieved, but it required proper governance leading to availability of fertilizer at the right time and at manageable prices. Governance being our major weakness, this could not be

achieved as urea prices were hovering at Rs. 1000-1100 instead of the government's fixed price of Rs 650 because of a lack of import management, hoarding, manipulation and cartelization.

: Wheat Demand – Supply Situation



Dr. Malik was still cautiously hopeful stating that Pakistan had all the capability of being a wheat surplus country if only we could manage our affairs properly. Though wheat production growth rate had been 2% over the last 10 years, it was not sufficient for food security, which required meeting the Medium Term Development Framework (MTDF) target of 3.8% growth. The MTDF goal could only be met if the 43.5% yield gap (where progressive farmer's got 4.6 T/ha while an average wheat farmer got 2.6 T/ha) was bridged. *By filling this yield gap in wheat and other crops, Pakistan could become not just food secure but also a food export country.*

Dr. Malik then articulated the five main issues, which had to be overcome to make this reality possible. Grasping change in the size of *Land Holdings* was the first. From 1972 – 2000, the number of farms of < 2ha had increased from 28.1% to 57.7%, those of < 5ha had increased from 68.0% to 85.5%, while the total farm area of < 5ha which constituted 30.4% in 1972 had changed to 43.4% in 2000. Changes in farm size distribution thus warranted a different strategy for delivery of inputs and services as well as marketing of agricultural produce, rather than ignoring the major chunk of our farmers while concentrating on the large farmer. The second issue was the *Cost of Production*. Resources for agriculture included land, water, and inputs including fertilizer, certified seed, mechanization and credit. With negligible increase in the cropped area, population growth of 2.4%, loss of cultivated land due to urbanization, industrial and infrastructure development, the cropped area per capita was decreasing at 1.8% a year such that in 2004-05 the cropped area per capita was 0.14ha compared to 0.21ha in 1985-86. Linking cost of production with *Slow Adoption of New Technologies*, he argued that out of 106 MAF of water, the actual crop use of water was only 41 MAF, a colossal loss of 61%. Further

- Growth rate in wheat production for the last 10 years has been 2%.
- MTDF has set a target of 3.8% annual growth rate for wheat.
- Demand includes: Human Consumption at 130kg/person; Seed (1.0 million Tons); Strategic Reserves (1.0 million Tons); Exports to Afghanistan and Poultry Feed (0.8 million tonnes)

demonstrating the lack of water conservation technology use, he listed figures for Cereal Production (kg) per m3 of Irrigation Water. Canada stood at 8.72, USA 1.56, China 0.82, India 0.39 while Pakistan was at 0.13. A similar situation existed for fertilizer. Though growth in fertilizer use (kg/ha) stood at 4.1%, the crop yield for wheat only grew by 1.7% from 1985-86 to 2005-06 and even lesser for other crops. This inefficiency in fertilizer use disproportionately increased production costs and could only be tackled through application of new methodologies and technologies. These included application of micronutrients, promotion of bio-fertilizers, fertigation to reduce nitrogen nutrient losses and development of site specific fertilizer recommendations based on soil testing.

: Table 01 Losses in Irrigation System

Location	Delivery at Head (MAF)	Losses (%)	Losses (MAF)
Main and branch Canal	106	15	16
Distributaries & Minors	90	8	7
Water Courses	83	30	25
Fields	58	30	17
Crop use	41	-	-
Total		61	65

Source: MTDF (2005-10) Planning Commission

: Table 02 Agriculture Credit Outreach by Province / District

Farmers Getting Loan (%)	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	Pakistan
Districts in which data on farmers is not available	1	6	4	4	15
Districts with no borrowers	-	-	9	7	16
up to 1%	2	4	13	18	37
1.1 – 5%	3	7	5	1	16
10.1 – 15%	17	2	3	0	22
15.1 – 20%	7	3	1	0	10
above 20%	1	0	1	0	2

Source: State Bank of Pakistan

“Can any industry in the country survive without provision of credit? If not then why was it expected from agriculture?”

But for Dr. Malik, the crux of the issue lay in Agricultural Credit. He posed a question “Can any industry in the country survive without provision of credit”? If not then why was it expected from agriculture? He argued that only 4% of banks' credit portfolio was disbursed amongst the farming community. Even after a lot of hew and cry, during 2007-08 (July 07- May 08), loans worth Rs.184.9 billion had been disbursed, which were only 56% of MTDF target for the year. The loan distribution though was even worse with Punjab getting the dominant share with 83.49%, Sindh 11.63%, NWFP 4.31%, Baluchistan 0.33%, AJK 0.23% and GilgitBaltistan 0.10%. But even in Punjab, the distribution was only restricted to certain districts as shown in the table. *Marketing*, facilitating farmers to sell their produce at market prices and *Climate Change*, leading to a perpetual change in weather affecting all crops of the country completed the five main issues.

Discussing the strategy to alleviate food insecurity, Dr. Malik argued for a combined effort to increase agricultural productivity, to timely announce indicative prices for wheat, oilseeds and pulses and to create a food safety net for the poor. A safety net was needed because the overall

poverty incidence of 22.3% (reference to Rs. 944.47 per person per month) had further increased because of an 18.3% increase in Consumer Price Index (CPI) since 2005-06.

He further suggested institutional reforms in the sector focused on credit outreach increase, improving governance, forming village organizations and introducing corporate farming. He argued that *Village Organizations would increase farmer returns by exploiting economies of scale in purchasing inputs and marketing outputs*. He gave the example of the unorganized dairy farmers who sold milk at Rs. 14 – 18 per litre while packed milk was sold to consumers at Rs. 46 per litre, arguing that a lot of room existed in increasing the share of the producer. Vertical integration with processing sector would improve farmer productivity but the share of benefits depended on farmers' negotiating power.

He argued that the suggested model of corporate farming was misunderstood as it did not imply inviting foreign investors to take over agriculture in Pakistan, but instead facilitating increasing number of resource poor farmers (86 percent have less than 12.5 acres and 39 percent fragmented), whereby farmers would become shareholders of the corporation, retain land ownership while land was managed by professionals with better access to technology and credit. This would encourage vertical integration (i.e. milk, fruits & vegetable processing) resulting in increased output and landowners' income, as well as benefit consumers through relatively lower prices.

He ended his talk with a quote from Mr. Sartaj Aziz " Countries in which land distribution is highly skewed and inequitable, prospects of reducing rural poverty will remain very dim. ...Big farmers invariably pre-empt a much larger share of irrigation water, inputs, credit and marketing opportunities. Without wide ranging agrarian reforms, only limited progress can be made towards the objective of reducing poverty."

“ Countries in which land distribution is highly skewed and inequitable, prospects of reducing rural poverty will remain very dim. ... Big farmers invariably pre-empt a much larger share of irrigation water, inputs, credit and marketing opportunities. Without wide ranging agrarian reforms, only limited progress can be made towards the objective of reducing poverty. ”

The talk was followed by Question-Answer session. When a participant asked, "Has the age of Land Reforms past?" he argued that for institutional reform of the agriculture sector, the issue was of a feudal society in which land was not the sole criteria. The "Chaudhry culture" pervaded every village of the country irrespective of land size. Thus a conscious effort through increased awareness and education was needed to speed up the historical evolution as only a large middle class and an educated society could change this culture. Similarly institutional arrangements in professional departments needed to change whereby departments such as Pakistan Agriculture Research Council (PARC) and Soil Survey of Pakistan should be headed by relevant professional experts and top class scientists rather than by bureaucrats.

Answering another question, he argued that there was a difference between speculation and forecasting. While speculation was an outcome of monopolization and cartelization where market was artificially manipulated, forecasting was instead a scientific method for understanding trends.

Responding to a question on Decentralization and the lack of farmer involvement in agriculture policy, he agreed that there was no justification of having Ministry of Agriculture in Islamabad, but the fault rested with the whole system. In the absence of a collective of village level organizations or a political party with genuine grassroots in the farming community, even decentralization would lead to similar ad-hocism. Instead, institutionalization of farmer's input was needed in policy making which was only possible when legislatures came from the ordinary farming community.

: **Dr. A. H. Nayyar**, Senior Research Fellow Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in collaboration with the CPPG conducted a day long workshop on the *Revival of Student Unions* on the 25th of November 2008. Participants included administrators and students from various universities and colleges in Lahore.

Among the first acts of the new democratically elected government was a commitment to reinstate Student Unions, which were banned under Martial Law in 1984 and later by the Supreme Court in 1993. A draft law in this regard was circulated. To examine the various facets of this law and what impact it may have on the institutions of higher learning in the country, two separate sessions in the day long workshop were conducted to gauge administration and student opinions with regards to the Revival of Student Unions in light of the proposed Act, and to devise a policy framework acceptable to both administrators as well as students.

The proposed Act suggested that the duly elected Student Union would be the sole representative body of the entire student community of the institution and be given representation on the academic and governing bodies of the institution, but not in matters concerning appointment and promotion of faculty and staff. This proposition was quite similar to the constitution of Punjab University in which Student Union was given representation in the Senate, Syndicate, Hall Council and Discipline Committee but not in the Academic Council. Additionally the Act suggested a *Code of Conduct* (that no student contesting elections shall: identify him/herself on ethnic, religious, sectarian but contrary to earlier tradition also on political basis; project political affiliations on campus or participate in strikes or agitation; carry weapons, narcotics or resort to violence), an *Eligibility Criteria* (requires written consent of parents/guardian, not convicted by law, not penalized by the discipline committee and not a defaulter) and an *Advisory Committee* (consisting of head of the institution and representatives of Student Union, faculty, parents and civil society).

Both sessions began with the simple question; *why should there be a Student Union on campus?* Among the administrators the opinion differed among those who were against any form of a Student Union and those who were

acceptable to a Student Union given a guarantee that there would be no political party interference. Administrations' concerns were rooted in the fears that Student Union would lead to interference by political parties (with their undemocratic culture and fascist tendencies) who would play out their differences on campus using students as mere tools leading to sectarian, ethnic and ideological differences becoming violent in nature. Additionally misuse of power by union officials through disruption in academic schedules and using their representation in governing bodies for commercial gain were other matters of concern. It was though clarified that the status quo and current situation at least in public institutions was not an absence of Student Unions but a lack of electoral process and their legal representation. While Punjab University, Islamia College Civil Lines, Science College, Lahore were dominated by Islami Jamiat –e Tuleba and Dial Singh College by Muslim Students Federation, it was disturbing to note that the actual conduct of these groups was undemocratic because they controlled the institutions by force and not by the ballot. Thus current situation was akin to 'warlordism' rather than an elected representative student body. It was also in times of ban that political party in power used MAO college premises for its election campaign while the tradition of bhatta taking from shops and bus routes in the area still existed. Even in terms of violence, situation in public sector universities had been worse in the time of banned union representation than before.

“ The status quo and current situation at least in public institutions was not an absence of Student Unions but a lack of electoral process and their legal representation. ”

Student political involvement, linkages with political parties and structure of student representation differed across the world. In the US, though Young Democrats and Young Republicans had a presence on campus, they had absolutely no link or involvement with the Student Government thus providing a clear separation between university student representation and political parties. This

concept of Student Government differed from Student Unions in the sense that elections did not take place between ideologically leaning organized unions but between individuals. (akin to the difference between non-party and party based elections). This was one reason why the culture of strikes and academic disturbance did not exist in US universities. But the political culture of the sub-continent was quite different where strikes seemed a necessary ingredient in registering one's voice and discontent. Thus disruption of academic activities could not be ruled out even when there was no involvement of political parties.

For the students though, Student Unions were a key element of their right of association as enshrined in the constitution, thus question regarding existence of Student Unions posed to them was itself misplaced. Their opinion differed regarding the role of political parties. Those wanting independent Student Unions argued that political parties had the whole country to do their partisan politics and bringing the same to campuses would leave no independent thinking among students, primarily because outside money and election support would heavily tilt the balance towards political party linked unions who would be nothing but puppets of political leaders. Those supporting the option of political party linked Student Union argued that in its absence, unions would instead be based on religious or ethnic grounds. Additionally with the voting age limit of 18, it was the students' democratic right to become part of the student wing of a political party, and practically speaking one could not limit support by political parties through back door channels. They argued that as democratic process at institutions' matured, autonomy of student wings would become necessary for staying relevant.

“... Student Unions were a key element of students' right of association as enshrined in the constitution, ...”

In the eyes of students, the university had three major stakeholders, the administration (including staff), faculty and students. Thus the main purpose of the Student Union

was a platform through which students could be represented according to their rights and interests. Additionally with current educational philosophy heavy tilted towards the jobs market, it was important to tackle de-politicization by raising civic and political awareness through extra-curricular activities, relate class room education to ground realities, and inculcate a democratic culture among students to prepare them for future leadership of the country. One student considered his current university environment as stifling arguing that a child born in jail does not understand freedom. Thus for students to learn about their rights and act responsibly, it was important to institute Student Unions in an evolutionary mechanism. Still they rejected a Student Union which was subservient to the administration, not allowed to conduct political activities or was not included in the decision making process.

“With current educational philosophy heavy tilted towards the jobs market, it was important to tackle de-politicization by raising civic and political awareness through extra-curricular activities.”

Most administrators agreed that a representative student body would help in smoother functioning of the university by allowing discussion with students regarding reasons for certain decisions, for disseminating these decisions among students; to oversee student activities, societies and their budgets, and to participate in various committees though without any decision making power. The primary argument against decision making power for students was to limit outsiders' options for influence. Those opposed to Student Unions argued that a number of student societies were already functioning and thus there was no separate need for a Student Union. At Government College University, a student representative body comprising of society presidents, toppers and athletes met the Vice Chancellor once a month and decisions taken in the meeting were implemented. Similarly at Forman Christian College, society presidents met the Rector on a regular basis for consultative sessions. Administrators thus accepted the

importance of a student representative voice but were not inclined towards institution wide democratically elected representation.

For administrators, the biggest concern was the affect of Student Union on the academic environment of the institution, specifically agitation and violence. Student's suggestion to limit violence was a regular election process making unions accountable to the student body, a strict adherence to the defined code of conduct and a functioning disciplinary committee. They took no responsibility for violence arguing that the lack of law and order in educational institutions couldn't be blamed on students but instead on weak administration quoting various examples where perpetrators were never taken to task. They argued for student representation in the discipline committee to make it more effective, while improving transparency and access to information for student representatives' accountability.

Some administrators agreed that a weak administration allowed students to create problems either with or without the help of political parties. But they put the responsibility of this weakness on the bureaucracy or political leadership whose support to the administration was based on their own agenda. Principals in some public institutions even owed their position to external elements and thus were very much a part of political maneuverings.

Students accepted agitation as an important basis of power for Student Unions but argued that student agitation was an outcome of a lack of effective representation within the institutional framework. Thus with a proper representative structure in place, resolution of student issues would not require a protest. However it was suggested that the constitution make stringent conditions for the provision of any strike such as a signed petition by 2/3 of the general student body.

“... student agitation was an outcome of a lack of effective representation within the institutional framework.”

Discussing the eligibility criteria in the Act, the administrators argued that it should be institution based though a general consensus existed in including grades in the criteria, while students argued that any full time student not on probation should be able to run for elections. Regarding Advisory Council, the administrators argued that teachers could also play an important role as neutral arbiters between students and administration as some were respected by students and could help resolve issues, but there was no consensus on faculty members playing an official role as advisors to the Student Union. However a consensus existed that the Advisory Committee should not include any outsiders – parents or civil society.

As a parting thought, an administrator suggested to change the concept of Student Union such that it assumes a cooperative rather than an adversarial role between the students and administration.

“... change the concept of Student Union such that it assumes a cooperative rather than an adversarial role between the students and administration.”

Visitors and Activities

January 28, 2009

CPPG organized a seminar by Dr. Nadeem ul Haque on *Rethinking Development Strategy* in collaboration with the Economics Department at F.C. College, Lahore.

January 29, 2009

Ms. Katie McDonald Associate Mission Director Democracy & Health USAID visited CPPG to discuss the *"Districts that Work"* program.

February 2, 2009

The Director, CPPG was invited by the Independent Planning Commission of Pakistan to give a talk on *Making Pakistan a Tenable State*, Lahore.

February 6, 2009

The Director, CPPG attended a one day interactive workshop on *Civil Services Reform* organized by the Management & Professional Development Department (MPDD), Government of the Punjab.

February 18, 2009

The Academic Council of F.C. College (A Chartered University) approved the CPPG proposed *Executive MA in Public Policy* program at its annual meeting.

February 24, 2009

The Director, CPPG gave a talk on *Population Growth & Implications on National Security* at National Defense University, Islamabad.

February 26, 2009

The Director & Research Fellow, CPPG attended a seminar on *National Commission on History* and participated in a panel discussion at the Department of History, University of the Punjab.

March 12, 2009

The Director, CPPG attended the workshop on *Indicator-led Local Governance Assessment* at Districts that Work (DTW), a project of USAID in Islamabad.

March 19, 2009

The Director, CPPG attended the workshop on the *Finalization of Civil Service Reform Policy* at Management & Professional Development Department (MPDD), Government of the Punjab, Lahore.

April 01, 2009

The Research Fellow CPPG shared his research on *Rickshaws & Environment Pollution: Assessing Punjab Government's Rickshaw Policy* as part of the Research Seminar Series at F.C. College, Lahore.

April 22, 25,29 2009

The Director, CPPG participated in the *Governance Institutions Network International (GINI) Training Needs Assessment* Sub-Committee, Executive Education Sub-committee and chaired the Annual Conference Sub-committee as part of an initiative to improve policy education and research in the country.

May 13, 2009

CPPG organized a one day workshop on *Human Trafficking: Challenges & Responses* in collaboration with IOM and Migration Research Centre at F.C. College, Lahore.

May 14, 2009

CPPG held a meeting with departmental heads of F.C. College to get feedback on proposed course outlines and faculty for its *Executive MA in Public Policy Program*.

May 20, 2009

The Director, CPPG gave a talk on *National Leadership & Institutional Framework* at the National School of Public Policy. Lahore

May 22, 2009

The Director, CPPG gave an interview to the *Daily Jang Newspaper* regarding Problems of Terrorism and Governance.

May 28, 2009

The Director, CPPG gave a seminar on *Transition from Agrarian to Industrial & American Reform Tradition* as

part of American History Course, Lecture Series, at Lahore Museum Auditorium.

June 3, 2009

The Director, CPPG attended the Planning and Development (P&D) report launching seminar *Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey* at the Pearl Continental Hotel, Lahore.

June 20, 2009

The Director, CPPG gave a talk on *Foreign and Defense Policy* at the Independent Planning Commission of Pakistan, Lahore.

June 27, 2009

The Research Fellow, CPPG attended the forum on *Analysis of City Districts Government Budget* organized by Punjab Urban Resource Centre at the Ambassador Hotel, Lahore

June 29, 2009

The Director & Research Fellow attended the international conference on *Macro-economic Stabilization, Recovery and Social Protection in Times of Global Economic Distress* at LUMS, Lahore

June 30, 2009

The Director, CPPG organized, served as focal person and presented a paper at the Policy Seminar on *Illegal Migration, Human Trafficking and Smuggling in Pakistan* for Actionaid, Islamabad.

Published Research

May 2009

CPPG published the research study *Rickshaws and Environmental Pollution: Assessing Punjab Government's Rickshaw Policy* as part of its Occasional Paper Series.

From Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam

For in and out, above, about, below,
'Tis nothing but a Magic Shadow-show
Play'd in a Box whose Candle is the Sun,
Round which we Phantom Figures come and go.

We are no other than a moving row
Of Magic Shadow-shapes that come and go
Round with the Sun-illumined Lantern held
In Midnight by the Master of the Show.

Would but the Desert of the Fountain yield
One glimpse – if dimly, yet indeed, reveal'd,
To which the fainting Traveller might spring,
As springs the trampled herbage of the field!

Then to the Lip of this poor earthen Urn
I lean'd, the Secret of my Life to learn:
And Lip to Lip it murmur'd – "While you live,
Drink! – for, once dead, you never shall return."

When You and I behind the Veil are past,
Oh, but the long, long while the World shall last,
Which of our Coming and Departure heeds
As the Sea's self should heed a pebble-cast.

Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam:
Rendered into English Verse
by Edward FitzGerald

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AND GOVERNANCE

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: **Jean-Luc Racine**, Senior CNRS Fellow at the Center for South Asian Studies, School for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences, Paris focuses on geopolitics of South Asia.

: **Kamran Rasool** former Chief Secretary Punjab, Federal Defense Secretary and Chairman PIA.

: **Babar Sattar** LL.M, a Rhodes Scholar who writes on social, political and legal issues and runs a law firm AJURIS.

: **Dr. Shafqat Shehzad**, Associate Professor Comsat University, Islamabad and former Research Fellow at SDPI specializes in health economics.

: **Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua** is a security studies expert specializing in defense decision-making and civil-military relations in South Asia.

: **Dr. Rukhsana Zia**, Director, Directorate of Staff Development (DSD), Punjab specializes in curriculum and management issues in education.



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